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Security is considered a critical aspect of software development. Many software programs 
have different processes or issues with respect to security due to the growth of internet-
enabled products [1]. These flaws might exist in different phases of software development 
lifecycle, such as the requirement phase, design phase, coding phase, etc. [2]. Thus, 
tackling security at the requirement phase will help to avert the need for rework [3]. 
Security practices in the requirement engineering stage of software development require 
knowledge of these practices in order to create secure software. The aim of this research is 
to develop a Requirement Engineering Security Maturity Model (RESMM) to assist 
software development organizations in better specifying the requirements for secure 
software. In addition, the outcomes of this research are expected to provide software 
development organizations with the ability to measure their maturity of requirement 
specification for secure software. Eventually, this work will put software development 
organizations in a better position to deliver software that is more secure. Systematic 
Literature Review (SLR) has been conducted to identify security practices existing in 
literature. The identified security requirement practices have been classified into seven 
categories. Each category contains different security practices that are gathered by the 
conducted SLR. These practices have been used in addition to the Sommerville [4] 
practices to develop the questionnaire tool, which was later distributed to ten organizations 
xv 
 
to highlight the most common security practices they use. These practices have been used 
in the development of RESMM. Two case studies were conducted with two software 
development organizations for the sake of RESMM-based assessment. Furthermore, two 
post-case studies have been done with two software development organizations to evaluate 
the applicability of RESMM in identifying the capability maturity levels of security 
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تعتبر الحماية من اهم المفاهيم في العديد من البرمجيات، حيث ان العديد من البرمجيات تمتلك بعض المشاكل والثغرات بالنسبة 
لك نتيجة الرتباط معظم البرمجيات باألنترنت. هذه الثغرات ممكن ان تتواجد في مختلف مراحل تطوير البرمجيات للحماية وذ
المتطلبات او في مرحلة تصميم البرمجيات او في مرحلة تطبيق البرمجيات عن طريق الكود جمع على سبيل المثال في مرحلة 
لة جمع البيانات سااوف يساااعد على تجنة بعاد  بنام البرمجيات من جديد. و ..الخ. فبالتالي التطرق لمشاااكل الحماية في مرح
ممارساااات التي يجة اتباعما من اجل بنام نظام أمن. ه الفالممارساااات األمنية في مرحلة جمع البيانات تتطلة معرفة ما هي هذ
اعد  منظمات جل مسااامن ا RESMMفالغرض من هذه الدراساااة هي بنام نموذج نضاااوج ألمنية هندساااة المتطلبات يدعى 
تطوير البرمجيات في تحديد المتطلبات لبنام نظام آمن بطريقة جيد . باإلضااااااافة الى ان العاهد من هذا البحث هو مساااااااعد  
منظمات تطوير البرمجيات من القدر  على قياس مقدار نضااااااوج تحديد المتطلبات من اجل بنام نظام آمن. وفي األنير ف ن هذا 
تطوير البرمجيات بأن تكون في محل ثقة من أحل بيصااال البرمجيات بأكثر أمنية. فقد تم اعداد ظمات من منالعمل سااوف يجعل 
( من اجل معرفة ما هي الممارساااات المتوفر  في األبحاس الساااابقة. فبعد ان تم تحديد ما عي SLRدراساااة بطريقة منتظمة  
مارسات الى سبع مجموعات. كل مجموعه تحتوي على ه الميف هذهذه الممارسات المتوفر  في الدراسات السابقة ف نه تم تصن
العديد من الممارسااات التي تم الحصااول عليما سااوام عن طريق الدراسااات السااابقة او عن طريق االسااتبيان الذي تم عمله مع 
بناًم بيان االسااتمجموعة من الشااركات من اجل معرفة ما هي الممارسااات األمنية المسااتخدمة في تلك الشااركات.  فقد تم بنام 
شركات من اجل معرفة  10، ولقد تم توزيع قاهمة االستبيان على Sommervilleعلى معظم ممارسات الموجود  في كتاب 
ما هي الممارسااات األمنية التي يتم اسااتخدامما في تلك الشااركات. فلقد تم اسااتخدام نتاها االسااتبيان في بنام نموذج النضااوج. 
( فقد تم تطبيق النموذج الذي تم بنام  مع بعض الشااااااركات من اجل عمل تقييم لمذا RESMM فبعد ان تم بنام النموذج 
النموذج في بيئة العمل. فقد ظمرت النتاها عن قابلية اسااااتعمال هذا النموذج من اجل معرفة مسااااتو  النضااااوج للممارسااااات 





1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Now, more than ever, businesses are growing quickly. All companies compete to 
deliver high-quality products and services quickly and inexpensively. Nearly all 
organizations in the twenty-first century have started creating increasingly sophisticated 
products. So, organizations must be able to control and manage more and more 
sophisticated development and maintenance processes. Moreover, the quality of software 
is the process which confirms the degree of excellence of the software [5]. Software 
applications are involved in various aspects of our lives. They are used for many purposes, 
such as recording and editing personal information, financial transactions, health records, 
managing critical data for businesses, etc. In this regard, a critical question that can be 
raised here is: how far can we put our trust in software? Furthermore, who is accountable 
for the security of the software applications we rely on? 
During the last fifteen years, different methodologies have been presented for 
incorporating security into the development lifecycle of software [6]. Thus, new practices 
have been implemented at various stages of the software development lifecycle to improve 
products’ security. Security measures such as the code review of security [7] and modeling 
of threats [8] have been involved in most software security methodologies to date. In the 
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present day, there are different tools that are used to support and review activities of 
security code [9]. In addition, there are also some automated tools for security static 
analysis that analyze programs in order to identify weaknesses of software security beyond 
requiring the execution of the code [6]. Generally, there are three levels where code is 
analyzed: the source code level, the binary code level, and the bytecode level [6]. In the 
current marketplace, there are several methodologies, maturity models, standards, and 
guidelines that can aid organizations in improving their business. One of these approaches, 
which focuses on software quality, is the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) 
[10]. The main goal of CMMI is to assess the capability of an organization by measuring 
the degree to which software processes are determined and controlled. There are 22 process 
areas in CMMI which guide software development organizations in executing each phase 
of the software development lifecycle (SDLC). However, in CMMI, no process area has 
been designed to address software security issues in general and, in particular, the 
requirements of security engineering issues. This does not mean that software security 
problems were never addressed before, but these problems were often underestimated, 
misunderstood, and not addressed in the way they should have been [11],[12]. 
Traditionally, security considerations are incorporated as an afterthought, which leads to a 
lifecycle of “penetrate-and-patch.” In addition, organizations spend vast sums of money on 
firewalls, intrusion detection systems, antivirus software, antispyware software, and 
encryption mechanisms [13]. However, this approach does not work perfectly, and 
organizations remain vulnerable to security risks and cyber-attacks that take advantage of 
security flaws [12]. 
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Since high-level security goals “tend to make security requirements not specific 
enough to guide designers and to verify that the requirements are met,” security 
requirements should therefore be able to “express what is to happen in a given situation, as 
opposed to what is not ever to happen in any situation” [14]. Furthermore, based on 
literature and studies [15],[16],[17], it is obvious that it is not easy to provide a simple, 
effective model to measure software security during the requirement phase. This is because 
the standards and best practices are too broad and provide too few guidelines for tackling 
security requirements using a simple method. 
Therefore, there is a need to investigate the current “generic and specific” model of 
goals and practices in relation to security requirements, with an aim to come up with a new 
process area based on collected evidence from relevant literature and software industry 
experience. In addition, we need to provide guidelines for measuring security at the 
requirement engineering phase of SDLC.  
Generally, this study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an 
introduction to the research and puts forward the objectives of the research. Chapter 2 gives 
a brief background of CMMI, the concept of software security, and related work and 
relevant literature. Chapter 3 presents the research methodology. Chapter 4 presents the 
results of both SLR and the questionnaire. Chapter 5 presents the development of RESMM. 
Chapter 6 presents the evaluation of RESMM via two case studies. Finally, the conclusion 
and future work is outlined in Chapter 7. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Security requirement engineering challenges in the software industry can be 
handled using various approaches. For instance, the industry can improve the security 
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awareness of software developers by hiring security experts or by setting up training 
workshops. In addition, a security consultant can be hired by an organization to investigate 
the activities of its SRE. But the cost of doing that would be high since these approaches 
could only be implemented in large-scale organizations. 
Several studies have been conducted on the techniques of building secure 
applications by both researchers and practitioners [18], but few studies have been done on 
models of security development that are used as guidance in the development process itself 
[19]. Moreover, incorporating security practices and proce sses into various phases of 
SDLC, such as the requirement phase, remains a challenge. In addition, prior to this 
research, there has been no study which provides a technique or tool that software 
organizations can use to identify the maturity level of their security requirement practices 
in software development.  
The proposed model of incorporating security practices into the requirements phase 
should be validated based on the usability and reliability of that model in the real world of 
the software industry. This model should also work in both small and large organizations. 
In addition, to reach to high influence, it has to cover most security requirement practices. 
1.3 Objectives 
The aim of this research is to identify an effective way to assist software 
development organizations in specifying the requirements for secure software. In order to 
achieve that, we will develop a new process area in CMMI called RESMM. We will draw 
upon the CMMI structure for the development of RESMM. We will employ practical and 
evidence-based approaches in order to develop RESMM, e.g., systematic literature review 
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and empirical studies related to the software industry. This two-step process will give us 
confidence in the reliability of the collected data. In addition, we will conduct a case study 
in order to evaluate RESMM in a real-world environment. 
It is expected that RESMM will significantly influence the software security issues 
currently reported in software development projects. This work will provide other 
researchers with a steady foundation on how to build new approaches to software security. 
New software security practices will then be developed to address a high number of 
security issues currently reported in software development projects. In addition, the project 
outcomes will enable software development organizations to measure their maturity by 
specifying requirements for secure software. Eventually, this work will put software 
development organizations in a good place to grant more secure software. RESMM will be 
available online to Saudi researchers and software practitioners. Managers of local Saudi 
software development organizations will be able to use RESMM in the evaluation of their 
strengths and weaknesses in terms of the design, implementation, improvement, and 
measurement of suitable processes to effectively manage their engineering security 
requirements. 
According to the purpose statement, the main goal of this study is to discover how 
security can be integrated into CMMI. As such, the following objectives are meant to be 
achieved: 
• Develop a process area, RESMM, for security requirements to assist software 
development organizations in specifying the requirements for secure software 
in a better way. 
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• Discuss the current practices of organizations in regard to software security at 
the requirements phase in order to identify security practices that are related to 
security requirements.  
• Propose measurement guidelines that can be implemented in the software 
development lifecycle to measure the level of security at the requirements 
engineering phase. 
• Demonstrate the applicability of the RESMM process area by applying it in a 
real-life case study. 
1.4 Contributions 
• Systematic Literature Review (SLR). This study is used to identify and 
characterize security requirements practices into different categories based on 
the area cover. The obtained practices of SLR have been used to develop the 
questionnaire tool, which was later distributed to 10 organizations to highlight 
the security practices used by them. These practices have been used in the 
development of RESMM.  
• Develop a requirements engineering security maturity model called RESMM 
that can help organizations to specify their requirements for secure software in 
a better way. In the development of RESMM, we will draw on CMMI structure, 
and we will create a process map/model for the requirements process area, 
RESMM. 
• Contribute into the bulk of literature in the field of software security and publish 
our main contributions in a journal. 
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1.5 Research Methodology 
The research methodology consists of the following four phases: 
Phase 1: Conduct a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) 
Three database sources (IEEE, ACM, and ScienceDirect) were used to obtain 
relevant studies for the research questions. A well-known protocol was used for doing SLR 
to make sure the same results would be obtained whenever the research was replicated by 
other researchers. Then, security requirement practices that have been addressed in those 
studies were identified. 
Phase 2: The details of Adapted Sommerville practices.  
We modified the requirement engineering practices proposed by Sommerville [4] 
into security requirement engineering practices. We modified 66 RE practices to RE 
security practices as shown in Appendix B (Altered Sommerville RE Practices to SRE 
practices). 
Phase 3: Administer a questionnaire to organizations 
 After the identification of security requirement practices from SLR, ten 
organizations were queried about the security practices they follow during the requirements 
gathering process. This procedure enhanced the reliability of the collected data and helped 




Phase 4: Develop a Requirement Engineering Security Maturity Model  
The development of RESMM was based on security practices identified via SLR 
and through questionnaires with different organizations. The structure of RESMM was 
based on CMMI. This study utilizes the outcomes of RESMM to develop security 
requirement practices across different categories. The assessment tool called Standard 
CMMI Appraisal Method (SCAMPI) [20] was chosen for the measurement of requirements 
security maturity due to its ability to appraise the events of organizations based on their 
maturity or capability level [20].  
Phase 5: Conduct a case study 
Two case studies were conducted with two software organizations to assess their 
maturity using RESMM. In addition, two post-case studies have been done to evaluate the 
usability of RESMM in a real-world environment. Feedback from those organizations has 
been taken into consideration. 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
This research is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a brief background about 
security requirements as well as an up-to-date literature review. Chapter 3 shows the 
research methodology in some detail. Chapter 4 presents the results of the application of 
RESMM, such as the security requirement practices categories. Chapter 5 describes how 
RESMM was developed. Chapter 6 consists of the case studies and explains their outcomes 
and feedback. Chapter 7 serves as the conclusion of this work and provides 
recommendations for future work.   
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2 CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides definitions of several software security concepts, standards 
of security, and security requirements engineering, and it presents some of the previous 
studies which have been done in the field of security requirements engineering and security 
practices at a different phases of software development. We also highlight the gaps in the 
previous research. 
2.1 Software Security Concepts 
The security software industry has grown rapidly over the last decade and still 
continues in its growth. Nowadays, software is used to control big financial systems, 
databases, and communication systems. Each software program has its own roles and 
functionalities, but each program is also vulnerable to attack due to its nature [21]. As a 
corollary, software is also growing in various aspects such as complexity, extensibility, 
size, and connectivity. Recently, attackers have exploited the extensible property of 
software programs to hack systems remotely [12]. Hence, there is increasing demand for 
security in software. 
Security is often defined as an add-on feature. Many organizations do not give 
much consideration to security at the pre-development and development phases, but they 
do consider it as a post-development activity. They incorporate security as a patch [22] 
after the completion of software development. In addition, organizations spend a lot of 
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money on the purchase of good firewalls and antivirus programs, thinking that these 
applications will be enough to make software secure. However, attacks continue to occur.  
Given the above discussion, it can be concluded that it is not good enough to secure 
software in a post-development manner, and there is a demand for discovering means and 
ways to enhance software security. 
System developers, requirement analysts, designers, and architects are often 
unmindful of the software security concept and specify a few or no security considerations 
during the development process. Due to such indifference, a number of security problems 
can occur in the software. According to a systematic mapping study [23], the requirement 
phase has not received its due interest in academic research. This emphasizes the pressing 
need to do more work at the requirement phase to address security requirements, since 
doing that can help with preventive detection and alleviation of security threats in different 
software systems. 
Different people have defined software security in various ways. One of these 
definitions says that “software security is about building secure software: designing 
software to be secure, making sure that software is secure, and educating software 
developers, architects, and users about how to build secure things” [24].  
Several factors introduce new problems to software. One of these factors is the lack 
of software development methodologies [25]. Another factor is the exponential increase in 
internet-enabled applications [22]. One more factor is the activity of hackers and 
unconscious internet users [26]. One of the most crucial points common to all of these 
problems is software vulnerability and weak spots that can be targeted by hackers. Software 
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vulnerability has been defined as “a weakness in the security system, for example, in 
procedures, design, or implementation that might be exploited to cause loss or harm” [22]. 
Some terminologies need to be explained to have a better perception of software 
vulnerabilities and issues of software security. These terms include asset, defect, bug, 
software security error, and software security requirements [23]. The asset is whatever is 
valuable that requires protection. Since the asset is always the target of threats, it needs to 
be protected. Many studies demonstrate that focusing on security at early stages can help 
organizations save billions of dollars, yet security concerns are usually addressed as an 
afterthought to functional requirements [27]. In fact, vulnerabilities will manifest in code 
if they are not detected during the requirements and design phases. So, building a model 
can help organizations check the security requirements in SDLC phases. 
2.2 Capability Maturity Model Integration  
Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) [5] is a group of best practices that 
can assist organizations in enhancing different processes of their activities. Best practices 
concentrate on the activities that are used to develop the quality of products and services 
to meet the needs of the end users and customers. These practices involve the lifecycle of 
the product from concept through delivery and maintenance. The reason for developing 
CMMI is to build a framework through the integration of various business maturity models. 
CMMI has different versions, such CMMI Version 1.1 (released in 2002), CMMI Version 
1.2 (released in 2006), CMMI Version 1.3 (released in 2010), and CMMI (released in 2018) 
[28]. There are 22 process areas in CMMI that guide software development organizations 
in what to do at each phase of SDLC. But unfortunately, there is no process in CMMI that 
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tackles requirements engineering security issues. A process area is a group of associated 
practices in an area which, if it has been totally implemented, will satisfy a set of goals that 
are considered crucial to making an enhancement in that area. Each process area has its 
own purpose as well as generic and specific goals in order to satisfy the purpose of that 
process. A secure software process can be thought of as the group of activities that have 
been undertaken to develop, maintain, and hand over a secure software solution [29]. So, 
for our process area, we will define the purpose of the RESMM process and follow other 
steps of the CMMI process formation to build our process. Both versions, CMMI v1.3 and 
v2.0, contain five maturity levels in CMMI: initial, managed, defined, quantitatively 
managed, and optimizing. Figure 2.1 shows the maturity levels of CMMI. Each maturity 
level tackles specific types of process areas. CMMI v2.0 differs from v1.3 in some aspects. 
The first difference is that CMMI v2.0 is focused on the performance practices since these 
practices have been integrated into all maturity levels of the model. This serves to enhance 
organizational performance in order to maximize return on investment (ROI) [30]. Another 
difference is that CMMI v2.0 focuses on enhancing the usability feature and integrating 
guidance since the architecture of CMMI v2.0 is scalable, which facilitates smooth 
integration of new content with some guidance into certain business needs. Moreover, 
CMMI v2.0 does not stipulate that technical business language must be written in that 
format. Thus, CMMI v2.0 is easier to understand and access by even non-native English 
speakers. In CMMI v2.0., it does not have generic goals and generic practices, which are 
found in v1.3. Building and sustaining practices have replaced the generic goals and 
generic practices in v2.0. Furthermore, CMMI v2.0 has a new appraisal method which 
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involves a statistically-validated random sampling approach. Thus, CMMI v2.0 has an 
improved value and reliability of appraisals. 
Recently, best practices for security have come into existence, but they must be 
integrated into a model or standard which would provide guidance to the extended 
developer community. In CMMI-DEV, there is a framework that has security activities, 
but it lacks guidance of security aspects [31]. According to that, we develop RESMM to 
assist software development organizations in better specifying requirements for secure 
software. The developed RESMM is customized with CMMI v1.3 and CMMI v2.0 since 
these versions of CMMI have the same components of CMMI levels. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Different levels of CMMI 
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2.3 Related Works 
Software security is a hot research topic. In the last decade, valuable contributions 
have been made in this research area from both academia and the industry. In the following 
section, we address different methodologies that integrate the security aspect in SDLC, and 
we show the popular practices that are common in these methodologies. These proposed 
methodologies assist in underlining the need for building security into the lifecycle of 
software development. 
For decades, almost all software developers seemed to be unconscious of the 
importance of software security, and they were much more concerned with implementing 
the functionalities of software to meet deadlines in the delivery of their products, always 
resolving to repair the inevitable bugs at the next release of the software [32]. This pattern, 
as adopted by developers, needs to change. Software vendors need to follow a stricter 
process of software development that shows more concern with security. The proposed 
process can help to decrease the number of security vulnerabilities at the design phase, 
coding phase, and documentation phase, and to reveal and eliminate detected 
vulnerabilities as early as possible in the software development lifecycle [33].  
2.3.1   Initiatives for Secure Software Development Lifecycle 
There are several studies that address security requirements at different stages of 
the software development lifecycle. One of these studies has been published by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and is titled “Security 
Considerations in the Information System Development Lifecycle.” This study proposes a 
framework to integrate the security aspects into the generic development lifecycle of 
software [34]. Furthermore, many IT managers recognize the need to integrate security 
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aspects into the software development lifecycle [35]. In 2002, Microsoft started 
Trustworthy Computing (TwC) [36], which was used by development groups to execute 
“security pushes” to discover ways to enhance the security of existing code. By 2004, 
software development at Microsoft followed a mandatory policy called Microsoft Security 
Development Lifecycle (SDL) [37], which includes amending the software organization’s 
processes by incorporating scales that result in enhancement of software security. 
Then, a whitepaper was published by Microsoft in 2013 under the title “Security 
Development Lifecycle for Agile Development.”[38]. It defines a process of using 
lightweight software security in the case of utilizing Agile software development methods. 
The aim of their paper is to combine the Agile methodologies with the proven Microsoft 
SDL by following a path that preserves the basics of both Agile and Microsoft Security 
Development Lifecycle [38]. The comprehensive Lightweight Application Security 
Process (CLASP) [39] is a structured and well-organized approach intended to tackle 
security at the earliest stages of the software development lifecycle. CLASP is an open 
source application that addresses the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) 
[39]. The objective of CLASP is to give more concern to security when constructing 
software. CLASP integrates the process of security at each stage of the software 
development lifecycle. It marks thirty activities of security and is related to one or more 
project roles [40]. The importance of developing secure software has increased due to the 
pervasive use of the internet and networked systems. Several ways have been used to 
prevent attacks, such as anti-virus software, firewalls, and “intrusion detection systems” 
[41]. However, attacks continue to occur. The reasons behind them are inherent in the 
software itself, i.e. poor documentation and disregard to security issues during software 
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design. Thus, a new area of research has come into focus called software security 
[42],[40],[43].  
Software attacks are tackled at the code level by using appropriate coding 
techniques. Here, however, it is proposed to secure software during the design [24], which 
means to tackle the security issues during the design phase, i.e. not as an afterthought. 
Although many organizations and companies have followed that afterthought, this has led 
to security problems after deployment of the software product. The elimination of such 
problems is expensive at that phase, compared with doing the same at earlier phases of the 
software lifecycle. McGraw (2006) [44] observed that 50 percent of security problems are 
encountered as a result of design flaws, and he demonstrates that the analysis of 
architectural risk is a core part of any compact security program. 
Several methods have been proposed for the analysis of security requirements. One 
of these methods is threat modeling [8]. The analyzers, who use the threat modeling 
method, are required to disband the software into tiny components and use the data flow 
diagram to draw the flow of data between those components. Data flow diagrams elicit the 
threats. After that, a probability and an amount of potential loss are assigned to be used as 
an assessment of each threat. If the precise architecture is not defined, it would be very 
difficult to accomplish this. In fact, threat modeling is more concerned with risk assessment 
than risk identification. But risk identification is more important at the requirement analysis 
stage. 
Security approaches are procedures or mechanisms that are incorporated during the 
development of secure applications by using systematic and well-defined methods. For 
example, risk analysis is a well-defined method that is merged into the Agile development 
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model. There are different studies on the use of risk analysis and threat modeling as a 
security technique or approach [45],[46],[47]. Several such studies have shown various 
degrees of similarity. The purpose of the threat modeling approach is to analyze the system 
from the security point of view by identifying and preventing any probable security risks 
to the system. Threat modeling helps in securing the system by building security at the 
beginning of the system development life cycle.  
Another example of a security approach is the use of the agility reduction tolerance 
approach, which is concerned with the efficiency of integration of some parameters of 
agility reduction tolerance using an activity integration algorithm. In this approach, it 
extracts security activities and identifies their degree of agility. However, no empirical 
studies have been done on comparing the effectiveness of threat modeling with other 
techniques. Haley et al. [48] presents a method to identify threats using the Aspect-Oriented 
Software Development (AOSD) approach and problem frames to elicit security 
requirements. AOSD is focused on eliciting threats but does not focus on design aspects of 
software.  
Another study has been done by Okubo et al. [13] focusing on the design of security 
aspects of software. They present an approach that would identify the security aspects at 
an early stage—the requirement analysis stage—with an expansion of misuse cases. The 
extension of misuse cases has improved the capability of visual assistants to elicit threats 
and security aspects. They evaluated their approach by applying it to a web application 
domain. Their approach shows in what place the threat could be encountered. So, it 
identifies those threats and adds them to a use case diagram since the objective of their 
work is to identify threats and to measure those threats as much as possible in the later 
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stage. The benefit of using this approach is to help architects to determine if the 
specification has met the desired requirements or not. However, there is still a problem 
with their approach since there are difficulties in clarifying all the prospective assets at the 
stage of analysis. Use cases have been used a lot in requirements engineering. They are 
appropriate for most functional requirements, but they have some limitations in eliciting 
security threats and requirements.  
A study by Sindre et al. [46] attempted to demonstrate a systematic approach to for 
eliciting security requirements depending on use cases. In their approach, they extended 
the original use cases to involve misuse of different sorts of extra-functional requirements 
beyond security. Another study showed that the approaches of industrial security can be 
deduced from the solution world instead of the problem world [45]. With respect to the 
consideration of security requirements, use cases can be modified to help integrate the work 
of functional and extra-functional requirements. The extension of use case diagrams to 
include the negative use case helps clarify the unwanted behavior of the proposed system 
for the objective of eliciting security requirements. Sindre et al. [46] addressed the 
guidelines to describe in more detail the method of misuse cases using textual templates. 
Furthermore, they addressed how method guidelines can elicit the security requirements 
by using misuse cases. Their approach has been checked in realistic settings and on 
examples, and it was recently used with security patterns and risk management. Their 
method guidelines are given to make sure the approach is valuable in the early elicitation 
of security requirements. However, the given method guidelines are still too general and 
inaccurate since the number of considered associated threats and potentially critical assets 
are large and the misuse-case approach is not likely adequate for all types of threats. 
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Current methodologies present guidelines that are concerned with specific areas, such as 
secure coding, risk management, and threat modeling [2],[49],[8].  
A study by McGraw and Chess (2008) [24] specified a framework for software 
security with intention to grab the overall high-level comprehension that involves all 
leading initiatives of software security. This framework has four domains and 12 practices. 
Each domain has its own practices. The most remarkable software security practices are 
code review and architecture analysis.  
2.3.2   Tools to advocate Security for Software Development 
Recently, several tools have emerged to support a secure software development 
lifecycle. There are tools for the requirement and design phases, such as architecture and 
modeling tools. In addition, there are tools for the implementation phase, such as code 
analysis [50]. Furthermore, there are several tools that are used for testing and other tools 
used for deployment phases (e.g., black box testing tools [51] and other tools for 
penetration testing [52]). All these tools assist the software development team to integrate 
security into the development lifecycle. Moreover, there are several tools that have been 
used for the review practices of security code, such as white box tools [51], which are 
considered essential for incorporating security in the software development lifecycle. 
White box tools are classified into static and dynamic analysis tools. Static analysis tools 
are used to analyze the software without requiring the execution of the software; these 
include binary code scanners, bytecode scanners, and source code security analyzers. 
Binary code scanners are used to detect the vulnerabilities of software via disassembly and 
pattern recognition. In case the source code does not exist, the bytecode scanners are used 
to detect vulnerabilities of software in the bytecode. Source code security analyzers are 
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used to check the source code in order to detect and report weaknesses that could result in 
security vulnerabilities. Static analysis tools are capable of examining the compiled results 
and can identify any possible vulnerability that could be caused by the compiler. However, 
the dynamic analysis tools look at the executing application in order to detect potential 
security vulnerabilities. These tools report scenarios of vulnerability at runtime and analyze 
the software application from internal and external viewpoints. One of the tools that 
analyzes the software from outside is the web application vulnerability scanner [53]. 
2.3.3   Existing surveys and systematic mapping studies 
A systematic mapping study called “Reusable knowledge in security requirements 
engineering” has been done by Amina et al. [54]. They showed the big picture of the 
existing literature on knowledge of security requirements engineering and reuse in security 
requirements engineering. They demonstrated the existing methods to be reused in security 
requirements engineering. In addition, they showed the existing modeling frameworks, 
techniques, and tools for reuse in security requirements engineering. Their mapping study 
analyzed more than 30 approaches that have been used in security requirements 
engineering for almost 20 years of research. The main contribution of their work was to 
come up with a framework to analyze and compare the various existing proposals as well 
as the taxonomy of future contributions which are concerned with knowledge reuse and 
security requirements engineering. They also defined the different forms of knowledge 
representation, and reuse was identified. Furthermore, they updated the previous surveys 




Another systematic mapping study on Security Requirements Engineering has been 
done by Naurin et al. [55]. In this study, they address the studies that have been done in the 
period 2010–2015. They analyzed, classified, and discovered the hot spots in the literature. 
In their classification, they included the different types of studies that have been carried 
out in security requirements engineering and what the top journals are for those studies. 
They also observed hot spots of various kinds with regard to security requirements 
engineering problems and the solutions to those problems that were addressed in the 
literature. 
A study by Shuaibu et al. [42] applied SLR to the security of web applications. 
They mentioned that there is no preferred development mode or standard to be used in the 
development of web applications. They found that the Agile development models had been 
given more attention, perhaps due to the participation of multiple stakeholders when 
deliberating the security viewpoints, since that helps in the conventional understanding of 
security requirements instead of imposing it on certain members of the development team. 
They also found that threat modeling techniques had been used to enhance security during 
development stages. They mentioned that the reason for using threat modeling techniques 
may be due to their effectiveness in tackling different kinds of vulnerabilities [42]. 
A survey [56] administered by the Computer Security Institute and the US Federal 
Bureau of Investigation in 2006 reports that computer security incidents were the cause of 
losses sustained by 131 respondents, with their losses estimated to surpass US $50 million 
in 2006. Excluding the incidents caused by computer security, the remaining damage cost 
about $30 million. Thus, the average setback an organization experienced was about 
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$230,000 for the year. This may be due to configuration errors; however, respondents think 
flaws in software security caused much of this cost. 
2.4 Missing Work 
Many security practices at the requirement phase [57],[58],[59] have been 
published in different studies, but these practices need to be tackled in a systematic way if 
they are to be used in the creation of a model for building secure software from an early 
stage of software development. In addition, many software developers are not aware of 
security practices at the requirements engineering phase of the software development 
lifecycle. Thus, the software industry needs to integrate security into the software 
development lifecycle, and it has been a crucial requirement for the software industry. 
However, incorporating security practices and processes into different stages of the 
software development lifecycle, such as the requirement phase, remains a challenge. In 
addition, in CMMI, there is no process area that has been designed to address software 
security issues in general and requirements engineering security issues in particular. So, in 
our study, we have developed a process area called RESMM. This process assists the 
software development organizations in better specifying requirements for secure software. 
Furthermore, no measurements allowing software development organizations to measure 
their maturity in specifying requirements for secure software are available. Thus, this work 
enables software development organizations to measure their maturity with respect to the 




3 CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we describe the research methodology for developing a RESMM. 
We go through different phases to achieve that purpose. First, an SLR is done to identify 
the existing security practices which are available in the literature. Second, a questionnaire 
is administered to different organizations to verify the collection practices we found in the 
SLR. In addition, in the questionnaire, the respondent organizations are asked about the 
security practices they used during the requirement phase of software development. After 
that, RESMM is built based on the feedback obtained from those organizations. Finally, a 
case study has been conducted to evaluate the RESMM with respect to software 

















Figure 3.1 Research Methodology 
 
3.2 Systematic Literature Review  
4. SLR is a method for appraisal and composition of primary research papers using a 
delicate and obviously documented methodology in the search strategy and chosen 
studies. This will minimize bias in the outcomes. In addition, the apparent documentation 
of SLR and the decisions taken will enable the reviewer to be updated.  
In order to conduct SLR to identify security practices at requirements phase, we 
need to follow certain steps throughout this thesis. Based on our research questions, we 
intend to follow a well-defined and accurate method to characterize, appraise, and illustrate 
all the relevant studies related to our research question. For this purpose, SLR here is 
established on the review guidelines which are offered by Kitchenham and Charters [60].    
Research Questions 
Systematic Literature Review 
Adapted Sommerville RE 
Practices 
Questionnaire with 10 
Organizations  
Built RESMM  
2 Case Studies  
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SLR protocol has been given to show the details of all procedures that we have 
considered during SLR (See Figure 3.2).  The main procedures are described as follows: 
1. Research questions 
2. SLR protocol 
3. Identification of relevant studies after applying the search string to Science Direct 
database 
4. Apply the selection process into chosen studies by the providing criteria 
5. Extraction and analysis of collected data. 
 
Figure 3.2 Systematic Literature Review Protocol [23] 
The result of the RESMM has a big influence on SLR outcomes. Before performing 
SLR, we need to consider several points that will help in the collection of primary studies, 
i.e. consideration of search strategy, determination of the digital libraries, identification of 
the selection criteria, and indication of the quality assessment criteria, if needed. 
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3.2.1   Research Questions 
Before going through the protocol of conducting SLR, we need first to define and 
construct our research questions. Since, we follow the Sommerville classification of 
practices in this study, we have identified eight research questions to be considered during 
SLR. These research questions are listed in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Research questions for systematic literature review 
No. Research Question 
RQ1 What are the practices for documenting security requirements? 
RQ2 What are the practices for eliciting security requirements? 
RQ3 What are the practices for analyzing and negotiating of security requirements? 
RQ4 What are the practices for describing security requirements? 
RQ5 What are the practices for modeling security requirements? 
RQ6 What are the practices for validating security requirements? 
RQ7 What are the practices for managing security requirements? 
RQ8 Security Requirements Engineering for Critical Systems? 
 
3.2.2   SLR Protocol 
In this section, we show the procedure of implementing the SLR. There are some 
points that need to be highlighted, i.e. research sources, selection criteria, search string, 
identification of the primary studies, and extraction and analysis of the collected data. Each 
point is thoroughly considered in coming up with convenient results. 
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3.2.3   Determining Research Sources 
We select three databases to serve as the databases source for the SLR. The selected 
databases have been chosen due to their large capabilities and the fact that the SLR is multi-
disciplinary with more focus on science and technology. Indeed, those databases contains 
a huge bulk of seminal and original research work. Table 3.2 shows the addresses for each 
research source. 
Table 3.2 List of research sources 
Research sources URL of advance search 
Science Direct http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/search 
IEEE Xplore http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/search/advsearch.jsp 
ACM  https://dl.acm.org/advsearch.cfm 
 
3.2.4   Defining Selection Criteria 
This sub-section is divided into two parts. The first part is the inclusion criteria 
which determine the studies chosen for investigation in more detail. Selected studies are 
closely related to our research questions. The second part is the exclusion criteria which 
rule out studies that are not closely related to our research questions. We select the study 
only if it satisfies all the inclusion criteria. Table 3.3 shows the inclusion criteria, whereas 
Table 3.4 shows the exclusion criteria. The main purpose of the selection criteria is to make 
sure the studies selected are related to the research objectives. The inclusion and exclusion 





Table 3.3 Inclusion Criteria 
No. Inclusion Criteria 
1 Related to the domain of secure software engineering 
2 Studies which focus on the most common security practices at requirement phase 
3 Published after 2005. 
 
Table 3.4 Exclusion Criteria 
No. Exclusion Criteria 
1 Non-English language 
2  Studies that are irrelevant to our research questions 
3 White papers, technical reports, master theses, Ph.D. dissertations, and textbooks 
4 Studies related to different domains  
5 Publications not published in a peer-reviewed format 
6 Papers without adequate related work 
 
3.2.5   Developing Search Strategy 
In this step, we construct the search string for our study. This can be done by 
following certain steps, such as population, intervention, outcome of relevance, and 
experimental design. After that, we are concerned with obtaining the synonyms of the terms 
that have been obtained from the previous step. In addition, we use the Boolean operator 
to combine the synonyms of terms. Finally, we verify the collected terms. Thus, we show 
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how we apply the search string into the ScienceDirect database. We build up our search 
terms by analyzing the keywords of our research questions from the four perspectives 
above: population, intervention, outcome, and experimental design. Thus, the strategy of 
the SLR search is instituted on these four steps as follow: 
 Population: security requirement  
 Intervention: the existing practices for secure software at an early stage of software 
development  
 The outcome of relevance: “Secure IS development,” “secure software development,” 
and “secure software.” 
 Experimental design: Empirical studies, SLR, expert observation and opinions, 
theoretical studies, and case studies. 
We explore the synonyms of the derived terms and combine the synonyms by means of 
Boolean operators, such as “AND” and “OR”. In order to test our terms, we validate the 
selected terms in ScienceDirect databases. Thus, the following synonyms represent the 
possible relevance to the topic, as follows:  
 Security requirement: “security requirements engineering” OR “security requirement” 
OR “SRE” OR “security development” OR “Secure requirement” OR “secure 
development” OR “insecure requirement” OR “insecure development”.  
 Practice: “initiative” OR “method” OR “patterns” OR “practice” OR “activity” OR 
“approach” OR “process” OR “steps” OR “technique” OR “technology” OR “model” 
OR “framework” OR “guideline”. 
 Secure software: “secure software development” OR “secure systems development” 
OR “secure software development lifecycle” OR “systems development lifecycle” OR 
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“SDLC” OR “software development process” OR “secure IS development” OR 
“software development lifecycles”. 
After we identify the synonymous terms, we verify the different terms in database sources. 
In the end, after many trials, we specify the chosen search string which we follow in this 
study: (“security requirements engineering” OR “security requirement” OR “SRE” OR 
“security development” OR “Secure requirement” OR “secure development” OR “insecure 
requirement” OR “insecure development”) AND (“initiative” OR “method” OR “patterns” 
OR “practice” OR “activity” OR “approach” OR “process” OR “steps” OR “technique” 
OR “technology” OR “model” OR “framework” OR “guideline”) AND (“secure software 
development” OR “secure systems development” OR “secure software development life 
cycle” OR “systems development lifecycle” OR “SDLC” OR “software development 
process” OR “secure IS development” OR “software development lifecycles”) [All 
Sources (Computer Science)]. 
This search string was tailored to correspond to each research source due to 
different mechanisms. If the accuracy of the search string was low, then the number of 
studies collected was too large. Thereafter, it required greater effort to identify the relevant 
studies. Details of the tailored search strings are listed in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5 Tailored search string based on searching rule in the research sources 
Sources Search string 
Science- 
Direct 
(“security requirements engineering” OR “security requirement” OR 
“SRE” OR “security development” OR “Secure requirement” OR “secure 
development” OR “insecure requirement” OR “insecure development”) 
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AND (“initiative” OR “method” OR “patterns” OR “practice” OR 
“activity” OR “approach” OR “process” OR “steps” OR “technique” OR 
“technology” OR “model” OR “framework” OR “guideline”) AND 
(“secure software development” OR “secure systems development” OR 
“secure software development life cycle” OR “systems development 
lifecycle” OR “SDLC” OR “software development process” OR “secure IS 
development” OR “software development lifecycles”) 
IEEE ("security requirements engineering" OR "security requirement" OR "SRE" 
OR "security development" OR "Secure requirement" OR "secure 
development" OR "insecure requirement" OR "insecure development") 
AND ("initiative" OR "method" OR "patterns" OR "practice" OR "activity" 
OR "approach" OR "process" OR "steps" OR "technique" OR "technology" 
OR "model" OR "framework" OR "guideline") 
ACM ("security requirements engineering" OR "security requirement" OR "SRE" 
OR "security development" OR "Secure requirement" OR "secure 
development" OR "insecure requirement" OR "insecure development") 
AND ("initiative" OR "method" OR "patterns" OR "practice" OR "activity" 
OR "approach" OR "process" OR "steps" OR "technique" OR "technology" 
OR "model" OR "framework" OR "guideline") 
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3.2.6   Collecting Relevant Studies 
To collect potential studies for the research, we applied the search string into the 
various database sources. The search string was applied several times on the databases to 
ensure the results were acceptable and accurate. The number of studies generated in each 
database query was more than a thousand, and most of them were not related to the 
research. Therefore, it was necessary to improve the search string syntax to ensure more 
accurate results. After updating the search string syntax and applying it again on the 
databases sources, the resulting studies were then classified. Classification was made by 
titles, keywords, and abstracts for relevance to the research. Then those selected were 
studied thoroughly.  
The selection process of relevant studies is divided into two parts. The first part is 
the initial selection of studies based on the satisfaction of inclusion criteria, and this was 
done by reading the titles and abstracts of papers. The second part is selection of the final 
papers from the list of the initially selected papers, provided that they meet the quality 
assessment criteria. This has been done by reading entire papers to determine whether or 
not they are strongly relevant to our work.  
3.2.7   Quality Assessment Criteria 
We adapted the quality assessment criteria proposed by Nabil et al. [23]. A study 
which obtains a total score of less than 3 is then rejected from the selected studies. The 




Table 3.6 Quality Assessment Criteria 
Criteria Notes 
Are the findings and results clearly stated in the paper?  Yes = 1, No = 0 
Is there any empirical evidence on the findings? Yes = 1, No = 0 
Are the arguments well presented and justified? Yes = 1, Partially =0.5, No = 0 
Is the paper well referenced (i.e. article references from 
various journals and peers reviewed conferences)? 
Yes = 1, Partially =0.5, No = 0 
 
3.2.8   Extracting Data and Findings 
At the beginning, we used Excel to arrange the selected papers after applying the 
search string in selected databases. We used two sheets in an Excel file—one sheet for the 
included papers and the other for the excluded papers. On the included papers’ sheet, we 
also created different columns. Each column represents one of the categories of the 
Sommerville requirement engineering practices. This helps to identify each paper by the 
practices it covers. Figure 3.3 shows the selection criteria of the papers obtained after 













Figure 3.3 Study Selection Criteria  
In this section, we present the results of SLR. A number of studies have passed the 
initial phase of SLR. Table 3.7 shows the distribution process of selecting the primary 
studies on the chosen research sources.  For instance, in ScienceDirect, we found 98 articles 
from 585 studies based on their relevance as reflected in the abstract and keywords. These 
selected papers are farther reduced by applying the quality assessment criteria. Thus 98 
papers were reduced to 29 which are considered to be the primary studies in the 
ScienceDirect database. The 29 articles were thoroughly read and analyzed with our 
research questions in view so as to identify the practices adopted in those papers. Appendix 
A (List of Primary Studies) is listed the primary studies selected for the review.  
  
Title & abstract Exclusion  
 Database Source 
Applying Inclusion & 
Exclusion Criteria  
Apply quality assessment 
Criteria  
Reading the whole papers  
Primary Studies  
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Table 3.7 Distribution of primary studies based on research sources 
Research Sources Total result Initial Selection Primary Studies 
IEEE 1031 139 41 
ACM 569 92 26 
Science Direct 585 98 29 
Total 2185 329 96 
 
Figure 3.4 Research sources of selected studies 
Second, the primary studies have been shown based on the publication channel in 
Table 3.8 and Figure 3.5. There are 63 primary studies that have been published in 
conferences, whereas 33 primary studies have been published in journals. This shows that 
most of the researchers who are interested in security requirement engineering have the 






IEEE ACM Science Direct
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Table 3.8 Distribution of primary studies based on publication channel 
Publication channel Amount % 
Journal 33 34.02 
Conference 63 64.94 
Total primary studies 96 100 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Selected studies based on publication channel 
We used Sommerville classification of practices in this study to classify the 
identified papers. Table 3.9 shows the core categories of software security practices which 
have been identified during SLR. These practices can be classified as follow: security 
requirements documentation, security requirements elicitation, security requirements 
analysis and negotiation, describing security requirements, security system modelling, 
security requirements validation, security requirements management, and security 
requirements engineering for critical systems. In addition, Table 3.9 and Figure 3.6 show 























1 Security Requirements 
Documentation 
24 19 9 52 53.61 
2 Security Requirements 
Elicitation 
40 37 20 92 94.85 
3 
Security Requirements 
Analysis and Negotiation 
















9 6 6 21 21.65 
8 
Security Requirements 
Engineering for Critical 
Systems 





Figure 3.6 Classification of papers based on security practices category 
3.3 Sommerville Practices 
In this section, we modify the general requirement engineering practices of 
Sommerville to be security practices instead of general requirement engineering practices 
[4]. We have modified 66 RE practices to RE security practices as shown in Appendix B 
(Altered Sommerville RE Practices to SRE practices). 
3.4 Building the Questionnaire  
After getting the security practices from SLR and after adapting Sommerville 
requirement engineering practices to develop security practices instead of general 
requirement engineering practices, we built the questionnaire as shown in Figure 3.7, which 
was later distributed to 10 organizations to obtain feedback and impressions about these 
practices and also to inquire about any additional security practices used in their 
organization. These organizations are developing different software and also provide 
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solutions, and market development with reports. Four of these organizations have a 
certificate on CMMI Maturity Level 3.   
We selected 10 organizations from all over the world. They have branches in Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, and Canada. These organizations provide different services to their 
customers such as mobile applications, accounting and administrative systems, ERP 
systems, intelligent vehicle tracking systems, and IT security services. The results of the 
questionnaires have been used in the development of RESMM.  
In the questionnaire, the respondent organizations were asked about the security 
practices they use during the requirement phase to obtain feedback, impressions about these 
practices, and information about any additional security practices used in the organizations. 
We have removed all those RE security practices which were not used by the organizations. 
In other words, we have removed the practices that were given the value “zero” by the ten 
organizations since these practices are never used by those organizations. The results of 
the questionnaire have been used in the development of RESMM. Figure 3.7 shows the 























3.5 Maturity Model Development 
The development of the RESMM is the fundamental task of this thesis. Security 
maturity model has been adopted based on several security practices published in various 
studies as obtained from SLR as well as the security practices deployed in different 
software industries. After the process of collecting security practices, these practices are 
used in the development of RESMM. Every category of RESMM contains some security 
practices which are assessed by SCAMPI appraisal [20].  
The RESMM followed CMMI structure. CMMI contains different process areas. 
Each process area has its own goals which can be either generic goals or specific goals. 
Each goal has its own practices/activities to achieve that goal as shown in Figure 3.8. 
 
 




3.6 Case Study 
A case study can be used to obtain more information about practical examples from 
the real world [61]. In this way, it is possible to clarify unclear information or measure the 
impact of a certain phenomenon, taking into account that every step to investigate the role 
of something in real life will ultimately result in optimization of results.   
For our purposes, a case study can be done by either meeting with organization 
personnel or through completion of an online form. In our case, we opt for an online form 
since most of the organizations are abroad. At the same time, there are some concerns that 
need to be considered, such as understanding the rationale of this research project, the 
awareness of the organization about the topic of this research, organizations’ willingness 
to partake in this study and provide the requested information (security practices used in 




4 CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
This chapter explains the results of the SLR conducted as a method to pinpoint 
security practices at the requirement phase. In addition, this chapter shows the outcomes 
of the questionnaire which we administered to 10 organizations. The protocol of SLR has 
been explained in the previous chapter (Chapter 3.2). At the end of this chapter, a summary 
is provided. 
4.1 Analysis and Results 
The last process of the SLR is to analyze and present the results. Different practices 
are identified and classified into different Sommerville categories. This information is 
obtained and categorized based on the data extraction fields. However, this process should 
include analysis, which is required by the research questions. Then, the presented results 
need to address defined research questions. We use different tables for the purpose of 
presenting SLR results. 
RQ1. What are the practices for documenting security requirements? 
Documentation is a way that lets customers, system users, managers, and system 
developers interact with the system requirements. Some studies have been designed to 
improve the structure of documents to include security requirement in the documentation 
of the system. As noticed Table 4.1, a few studies have been done on the practices of 
security requirements documentation.  
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Table 4.1 Security Requirements Documentation Practices 







- Document the Conceptual security artefacts,  
- Document the security policies of the organization 
[63] 
- Initiate templates for documentation of security requirement 
specification. 
[3] 
- Security requirements should be expressed as positive 
statements and not negative statements. 
- Develop a security catalog 
[64] 
- Defined security policies will improve software security. 
- Policies of the organization should be set clearly.  
- Define the impact of policies on stakeholders.  
- Check and update security policies whenever there is any 
change in the Org.  
- Document changes of policy.  
- Enhance security by implementing overall legislative and 
regulatory policies. 
[65] - Security policy documents will help in indicating the laws, 
rules, and practices to manage sensitive information. 
[40] - Develop organizational policy document. 
- Identify resources and trust boundaries  
- Identify resources capabilities and link them to roles.  
- Determine profiles of attackers.  
- Document logistics aspects that are available in the Org. 
[66] - Document the security-related procedures (Management) 
- Document security configuration items of the system 
- Determine the standard procedure  
[67] - Security document should include a Security Target and 
Protection Profile. 
[57] - Use a standard for documenting security requirements 
[68] - Security document should include a Software Security 
Authorization Agreement  
[58] - Use standards for security-related Coding  
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[69] - Use a standard called ISO 15408 that contains Common 
Criteria for Security Evaluation of Information Technology. 
[70] - Security requirements specification understandability. 
- Support for non-security experts. 
[71] - Security statements Document 
[72] - Develop a security policy with a separation of duties. 
[73] - Identifying Document Interdependencies                
- Develop a security requirements category hierarchy. 
 
RQ2. What are the practices for eliciting security requirements? 
 This refers to the process of capturing the security requirements of the system by 
connecting with customers, system users, and others who are interested in the development 
of the system. Studies have shown various methods and practices for eliciting security 
requirements of systems. As noticed in Table 4.2, most studies have been done in this area. 
Table 4.2 Elicitation Practices of Security Requirements 





[62] - Identify the security policy of the organization. 
- Dictate overall security measures. 
- Perform security assessment on the system. 
[74] - Specify security needs by using SDA: secure development 
of applications. 
[75] - Attack path analysis: to identify internal vulnerabilities. 
- Perform security assessment. 
- Identify what should be implemented on safety system 
security capabilities. 
[76] - Build threat models. 




[63] - Determine the level of granularity.  
- Identify the system based on business pattern. 
- Identify the system based on application pattern. 
-  Determine potential threats at the business level.  
-  Determine potential threats at the application level. 
- Identify and evaluate threats. 
- Determine types of attackers and potential attacks. 
-  Assess attack impact. 
-  Evaluate and prioritize security risks. 
-  Identify the system behavior whenever there is an attack. 
-  Specify security requirements. 
[3] - Elicit adequate security requirements. 
- Analyze the assets to be protected.  
- Analyze the threats from which assets should be protected. 
- Consider security during the elicitation of software system 
requirements using problem frames. 
- Identify security requirements with the aid of previous 
security knowledge. 
[77] - Analyze the context of organization with respect to the 
operational environment. 
- Derive the dependencies of functional requirements with 
security requirements and trust requirements. 
[65] - Analyze clearly the possible security risks in order to be 
reduced. 
- Identify possible security threats which are relevant to the 
security requirements by using misuse cases and attack 
trees. 
- Identify security violation scenarios. 
[78] - Use the concept of extended constraint to represent the 
security concept. 
- Use the extended Tropos concepts with security in mind 




[79] - Elicit the relevant security and privacy properties of the 
system. 
- Analyze of the critical areas to identify new concepts.  
- Link the new concepts with the threats and issues that 
connect to critical areas. 
[80] - Perform a detailed risk assessment and an understanding of 
regulatory and compliance requirements. 
- Derive security requirements from business objectives. 
- Assess high-level risks and use cases related to security 
threats.  
- Incorporate prioritization of security vulnerabilities as part 
of the software release and defect repair planning. 
[40] - Consider two perspectives: the black-hat and the white-hat. 
- Elicit the abuse cases for the system by using attack 
patterns. 
[81] - Define security requirements by using the i* framework. 
- Identify threats and attacks on the requirements and the 
data repository. 
[66] - Comprise the function of software security. 
- Cover the security environment. 
- Consider operation of security environment. 
- Identify general and specific security requirements. 
[82] - Do processes of separate risk analysis with considering 
safety and security respects. 
[83] - Analyze systems for potential insider threats. 
[57] - Identify the process of information security and the 
requirements that are related to information security by 
using the history information of the product and/or service. 
[68] 
- Identifying associated stakeholders  
- Assess the impact of operation with respect to security. 
[58] - Identify security-sensitive assets 
- Formulation of abuser stories. 
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[84] - Identify sensitive system resources. 
- Identify entities that are possible threats to system. 
- Identify persons who may be threats to system. 
[85] - Identify goals. 
- Derive security requirements from the goals. 
[70] - Develop misuse scenarios and potential threats to the 
system. 
- Usability of security requirements specifications. 
[86] - Identify the stakeholders of SRE process. 
- Elicit the goals of requirement. 
[87] - Identify security goals. 
- Discover security goals  
- Organize security goals related to the assets. 
- Capture relationships among goals. 
[71] - State the misuse cases. 
- Derive potential outcomes from the stated misuse cases.       
- Determine possible threats. 
[72] - Identify appropriate security goals. 
- Enumerate security goals based on assets in the system. 
- Elicit possible harm (threat descriptions). 
[73] - Use a goal-driven requirements strategy to elicit SR. 
- Identifying security requirements attributes. 
- Identifying requirements interdependencies 
- Perceive related risks in the operational environment.   
 
 The preceding practices are the existing security practices in the literature. We 
have identified those practices under the category of elicitation of security requirements 
since this helps in the elicitation process of security requirements. These practices are 
considered as a part of the questionnaire administered to the targeted organizations. After 
that, and based on the responses of sample organizations, the agreed practices are 
incorporated in the building process of RESMM, as shown in Chapter 5. 
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RQ3. What are the practices for analysis and negotiation of security requirements? 
 After doing the process of security requirements elicitation, we come up with an 
initial set of security requirements which need to be analyzed for conflicts, inconsistencies, 
omissions, or overlap. So, in this practice, the developer tries to solve those issues by 
negotiating with system stakeholders in order to agree on a set of system security 
requirements. Some studies address how to analyze the agreed security requirements of the 
system. As noticed in Table 4.3, many studies have been done in this area. 
Table 4.3 Security Requirements Analysis and Negotiation Practices 






[62] - Use the model-based paradigm to analyze the system 
needs and requirements. 
- Analyze use cases to determine a set of possible threats. 
- Specify minimal set of rights for each access control role. 
- Identify proper countermeasures for every security threat. 
introducing a structure mandatory security measure. 
[88] - Threat modeling: Analyzing the probable attacks or threats 
to a system in a given context. 
[89] - Analyze access control requirements by using AuthUML. 
- Analyze the authorization requirements. 
[75] - Attack Analysis to identify what are the accessible 
discipline to the system. 
[76] - Detect potential vulnerabilities of system by gathering 
system information from several perspectives. 
[63] - Identify conflicts due to composition or integration 
scenarios. 
- Remove redundancies and refine ambiguous requirements. 
- Classify elicited security requirements. 




[3] - Identify and analyze the system assets, threats, 
vulnerabilities and requirements. 
- Make security requirements as adequate as possible.   
 [64] - Hand out revised policies to all related stakeholders.  
- Make sure about the awareness of security policies. 
- Conduct comprehensive risk analysis to improve software 
security. 
[79] - Analyze the context of the Org. within the environment of 
the system. 
- Determine the domain actors.  
- Determine the dependencies of actors with other actors. 
- Analyze functional dependencies with security and trust 
requirements. 
[65] - Identify all potential security threats using misuse cases 
and attack trees. 
- Identify misuse cases (beside the normal use cases).  
- Prioritize misuse cases. 
- Create an attack tree which will determine the scenarios of 
intrusion. 
[78] - Have an understanding of the security problems of 
organization by analyzing existing setting of organization.  
- Describe the operational environment of the system with 
related functions and security requirements. 
[79] - Consider the concepts from organization areas.  
- Define a set of notations and security concepts during the 
analysis process of software development. 
- Consider related security and privacy properties, threats, 
and risks 
[90] - Risk identification. 
[40] - The definition of use scenarios.  
[81] - Goal/Soft-goal analysis: use the security policy document 
to analyze the goals of the organization.  
50 
 
[66] - Conduct threat and hazard analysis. 
- Determine security configuration items.  
- Identify the performance of software configuration, 
security functional. 
[63] - Apply separate risk analysis for safety of software and 
software security.  
- Identify interactions that could exist between security and 
safety requirements  
- Identify measures that has to be implemented, changes in 
the software, and evaluate the effects of the identified 
measures. 
[83] - Conditional Reachability Analysis. 
- Log-trace Reachability Analysis. 
- Determine the state of the system before, under, and after 
the attack. 
[91] - Define information security requirements: focuses on the 
security issues. 
- Analyze available environment options 
- Risk analysis 
[68] - A risk assessment taxonomy 
[58] - Abuser story Risk assessment 
[84] - Analysis of external and internal security threats. 
- Analysis of Security Risks 
[85] - Perform risk assessment 
[70] - Relate requirement artifacts to test case artifacts  
[86] - Identify security risks based on possible influences of the 
security threats.  
- prioritization of security goals. [71] - Asses security solutions 
[72] - Revise possible Harm 
[73] - Risk assessment taxonomy 
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The preceding practices are the existing security practices in the literature. We have 
identified those practices under the category of analysis and negotiation of security 
requirements since this helps in the analysis of the identified security requirements. These 
practices are considered as a part of the questionnaire administered to the targeted 
organizations. After that, and based on the responses of sample organizations, the agreed 
practices are incorporated in the building process of RESMM as shown in Chapter 5. 
RQ4. What are the practices for describing security requirements? 
 The identified security requirements should be described in a concise, 
understandable, and unambiguous manner. As noticed in Table 4.4, a few studies have been 
done in this area. 
Table 4.4 Describing Security Requirements Practices 





[62] - Use the simple micropattern textual template.  
- Security requirements have to be correct, consistent and 
complete. 
[3] - Security requirements need to be adequate as possible. 
This means, they should be explicit, precise, complete and 
non-conflicting with other requirements. 
[40] - Describe abuse cases by examples. 
[81] - Use metadata to show a prototype model for data security   
- Describe stakeholder concerns and interests by using the 
Strategic Rationale (SR) model. 
 
[66] - Use UML Diagrams to describe security processes. 
- Misuse Case Description Templates 
- Security Use Case Description Templates 
[67] - Protection profiles should be unambiguous 
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[92] - Describe security requirements using metaclasses 
especially for common rational agent within systems. 
[68] - Use a standard of DoD process for identifying 
information security requirements. 
[58] - User stories using understandable language. 
- Determine security requirements as standard User stories 
[86] - Use common terminology to define Requirements which 
are simple and non-technical jargon. 
[72] - Describe the used security mechanisms to express security 
requirements such as ISO 15408 
[73] - Dealing with Natural-Language Requirements. 
- Organize the concepts of problem domain and expresses 
them in natural language regulatory documents.   
  
 The preceding practices are the existing security practices in the literature. We 
have identified those practices under the category of describing security requirements since 
this helps in the analysis of the identified security requirements. These practices are 
considered as part of the questionnaire administered to the targeted organizations.  
RQ5. What are the practices for modeling security requirements? 
The idea of this practice is to build an abstract model for the system that includes the 
security aspect. This model shows the system environment with respect to security issues 
and the architecture model for the whole system. This model is considered a high-level 
model, which can help to reveal hidden requirements. There are different languages used 
for security modeling, such as Security Risk-Oriented BPMN, Secure TROPOS, KAOS 
Extension to Security, Misuse Cases, Mal-Activity Diagrams, UMLsec, and SecureUML. 
Some studies show how to model the system with security concerns. As noticed in                       
Table 4.5, several studies have been done in this area. 
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Table 4.5 Modeling Practices of Security Requirements 






- Model attackers to the system 
- Model potential attacks (threats) to a system. 
[89] - Modeling security requirement using UML 
[76] 
- Establish a link between security requirements models and 
security implementation models. 
[3] - Use problem frames to model security requirements 
[1] - Use formal process algebra for modelling threats. 
[77] 
- Identify the main stakeholders  
- Identify the objectives of stakeholders by using Actor 
modeling. 
- Specify services based on the identification of actors. 
- Identify actors delegating to other actors by using 
Permission delegation modeling. 
- Identify actors who possess the services by using Trust 
modeling. 
[65] 
- Model the System's Environment with security 
consideration. 
[81] 
- Modeling and rationale the environment of organization 
and its information system. 
- Use metadata to make a prototype model for system 
security. 
- Use Goal modeling diagram or Softgoal modeling 
diagram. 
[83] 
- Model the real-world systems and provide an underlying 
semantics. 
- Specify models for system by defining a certain language. 
- Represent and develop concrete models by define 
modelling language. 




- Understand the environment of the system.  
- Recognize the risks that are related to each domain. 
- Define the environment and the scope and boundaries of 
the system. 
- Show the effects of system failure on the environment due 
to combination of accidental conditions. 
- Model partitioned architecture.  
- Annotate model of the system with security properties 
which are devoted to safety and security policies. 
[92] 
- Manage the own security of each agent by identifying 
internal concepts required. 
[76] 
- Use Graphical modeling approaches: 
- Semi-formal safety/security cases. 
- Goal structuring notation which is considered to be a 
graphical argumentation notation.  
[68] 
- Modeling of system’s environments and domain 
knowledge 
[58] - Formulation of Abuser stories (Threat scenarios) 
[73] - Using various GenOM modeling constructs to express SR. 
 
The preceding practices are the existing security practices in the literature. We have 
identified those practices under the category of modeling security requirements since this 
helps in revealing hidden security requirements. These practices are considered as part of 
the questionnaire administered to the targeted organizations. After that, and based on the 
responses of sample organizations, the agreed practices are incorporated into the building 




RQ6. What are the practices for validating security requirements? 
The collected security requirements, which are documented, need to be validated for 
conflicts, omissions, and ambiguities. As noticed in Table 4.6, few studies have been done 
in this area. 
Table 4.6 Validating Practices of Security Requirements 





[62] - Inspect the effects of each security countermeasure 
manually and link back the security countermeasure to 
the security requirements. 
[89] - Validate authorization requirements compliance with 
separation of duty principle. 
- Security Requirements Artefacts Inspection. 
[75] - Publish a report about cyber security for the system. 
- Penetrate testing to address what are the problems of 
technical security. 
[63] - Software Testing Specification Template. 
- Internal validation by implementing an inspection of the 
particular security requirements. 
- External validation by estate review meetings with 
different actors who are involved in the developing 
process. 
[65] - Use contracts items to validate security vulnerabilities. 
[81] - Internal validation and external verification. 
- Carry out a verification process that involves checklists, 
peer reviews, or Fagan’s methods. 
- Use graph-based approach to reveal and solve any 
conflicts which can be accrued to the specification of 
Access Control policies. 
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[66] - Perform a program for quality assurance that would 
support security activities. 
- Make sure about the regularity of the safety and the 
features of logical software security in the intended 
environment. 
- Perform a review for the quality of security. 
- Consider the mechanism that is involved in the software 
development by establishing traceability among these 
mechanisms. 
- Conduct periodic reviews. 
[57] 
- Security features artefact of the system need to be 
reviewed and refined by using rigorous scientific 
evaluation methods with iterative cycle. 
[92] 
- Generate a counter-example whenever there is 
requirements violations. 
- Use a model checking. 
[67] - Simulate the platform of the systems by using prototype. 
[68] - Cross-checked with the operational environment  
[58] 
- Validate Security-related User stories directly by using 
integration testing with other User stories. 
[93] 
- Use a Goal Oriented Requirements Engineering 
techniques for validating the completeness of security 
requirements and modelling stakeholder rationale, as well 
as building threat trees and modelling vulnerabilities and 
their effect. 
[69] 
- Traceability and consistency checks between different 
kinds of UML models. 
[85] - Inspect and validate requirements. 
[70] 
- Misuse Test Cases 
- Requirement Test Cases 
- Threat Test Cases. 
[71] 
- Security Requirements Test Cases 
- Misuse Cases Test Cases 




- Construct a satisfaction argument.             
- Revise Application Business Goals & Quality Goals 
- Check the Security Goals against Threats, Assets and 
Business Goals. 
[73] 
- Use testing procedures that can be used for checking to 
the compliance levels of the target system. 
The preceding practices are the existing security practices in the literature. We have 
identified those practices under the category of validating security requirements since this 
helps in the validation of conflicts, omissions, and ambiguities of security requirements 
revealing hidden security requirements. These practices are considered as part of the 
questionnaire administered to the targeted organizations. After that, and based on the 
responses of sample organizations, the agreed practices are incorporated in the building 
process of RESMM as shown in Chapter 5.  
RQ7. What are the practices for the management of security requirements? 
 This process is concerned with the change that could be effected in system security 
requirements. As noticed in Table 4.7, very few studies have been done in this area. 
Table 4.7 Management Practices of Security Requirements 





[75] - Select applicable security controls 
[94] - Use the concepts of case-based management system which 
involve the knowledge-based management besides an 
artifacts management. 
[95] - Use an extend Secure Tropos which involves a risk-driven 
goal-based process for managing security requirements. 
[96] - Carry out a role-based access scheme. 
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- Implement the principles of separation of duties. 
[73] - Define the Management control policy for SR. 
[66] - Define the configuration items of security into software 
requirements.  
- Assess the impact of any suggestion of changes. 
- Evaluate the procedures of operating for compliance with 
respect to the intentional use. 
- Analyze the risks of security which may affect the 
licensee and the system.  
- Introduce security mechanism to control the environment 
of software maintenance whenever there is change of data. 
 
 The preceding practices are the existing security practices in the literature. We 
have identified those practices under the category of management of security requirements 
since this helps in the validation of conflicts, omissions, and ambiguities of security 
requirements revealing hidden security requirements. These practices are considered as 
part of the questionnaire administered to the targeted organizations. After that, and based 
on the responses of sample organizations, the agreed practices are incorporated in the 
building process of RESMM as shown in Chapter 5.  
RQ8. What are the practices of Security Requirements Engineering for Critical 
Systems? 
 This process is concerned with the systems that have to contain stringent 
reliability, availability, maintainability, safety, or security requirements. If these systems 
fail, the cost here would be very high, so the requirements engineering and system 
development processes must ensure that stakeholders have confidence in these systems. As 
noticed in Table 4.8, very few studies have been done in this area. 
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Table 4.8 Security Requirements Engineering Practices for Critical Systems 








- Select applicable security controls 
[96] - Consistency of Definitions (Before the security 
requirements analysis of an organization go farther it have 
to be agreed about all relevant terms and definitions 
during the security analysis process. 
[68] - Use a model for modelling the requirements domain with 
respect to security requisites and policies;  
- Perform risk assessment taxonomy.  
- Provide a process for aspect knowledge  
- Create Meta-knowledge about information of the system. 
- Interdependencies between entities of the system. 
 
 [95] - Use an extend Secure Tropos which involves a risk-driven 
goal-based process for managing security requirements. 
 
4.2 Outcomes of Questionnaires:  
Security Requirements Practices 
This study uses the Sommerville classification of practices. This classification 
consists of core categories of software security practices which have been identified during 
SLR in addition to the adapting of Sommerville RE practices. These practices can be 
classified as follows: security requirements documentation, security requirements 
elicitation, security requirements analysis and negotiation, describing security 
requirements, security system modelling, security requirements validation, security 
requirements management, and security requirements engineering for critical systems. A 
questionnaire was developed and administered to 10 organizations to gauge their responses 
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toward those practices which are important. In that questionnaire, we asked them to follow 
the following structure: 
For the following section, choose from the following four types of assessments for each 
SRE practice: 
 High Perceived Benefits (H): The practice is mandatory. 
 Medium Perceived Benefits (M): The practice occurs often in the organization’s software 
development but is not mandatory. 
 Low Perceived Benefits (L): The practice is only used in certain situation. 
 Zero Perceived Benefits (Z): The practice is never or rarely used in that organization. 
In the questionnaire, the respondent organizations were asked about the security practices 
they use during the requirement phase to obtain feedback, impressions about these 
practices, and information about any additional security practices used in the organizations. 
The responses to the questionnaire came from different employees who worked in those 
organizations, including a technical team leader, an application development manager, and 
a systems analyst. These employees had worked in those organizations for nearly ten years. 
There was one submission from each organization, and there were ten total responses. We 
contacted the ten organizations via official email, and they forward our emails to the 
corresponding employees, who then answered the questionnaire. Table 4.9 shows the 




Table 4.9 The details of the organizations and the participants who filled the questionnaire 









































































After receiving the responses from the ten organizations, we removed all those RE 
security practices which were not used by the organizations. In other words, we removed 
the practices that were given a value of “zero” by the ten organizations since these practices 
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are never used by those organizations. However, if one of the ten organizations gave the 
practice a score of “low” and the other nine organizations gave the value “zero,” we 
included this practice in the development of RESMM since each organization represented 
10% of the total number of organizations. The results of the questionnaire were used in the 
development of RESMM.  
The responses of these ten organizations, including the security practices used by 
them, were integrated in the requirement phase of software development. We classified 
these practices into seven categories, following the Sommerville classification. 




H M L Z 
SRD1 Define a standard security document structure 7 2 1 0 
SRD2 Explain how to use the security document 7 1 2 0 
SRD3 Define Security Definitions, Quality Gates and security 
policy of the organization. 
10 0 0 0 
SRD4 
Make a separate information security policy such as: 
(Access Control Policy, Classification Policy, Backup 
Policy… etc.) 
6 1 0 3 
SRD5 
Define and document a project’s security bug bar.  
(Establish a minimum level of quality) 
8 2 0 0 
SRD6 Define Security Objectives Document. 0 0 0 10 
SRD7 Define Security Requirements Rationale Document. 0 0 0 10 
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SRD8 Define Protection Profile documents 0 0 0 10 
SRD9 
Define Security Problem Definition Document which 
must contain the threats, assumptions, and conformance 
claims. 
0 0 0 10 
SRD10 Define Risk Assessment Document 0 0 0 10 
SRD11 Include a summary of the security requirements 7 3 0 0 
SRD12 Make a business case for the system with respect to 
security 
10 0 0 0 
SRD13 Define specialized security terms 8 2 0 0 
SRD14 Make document layout readable 8 1 1 0 
SRD15 




7 3 0 0 
SRD16 Help readers find information 6 2 2 0 
SRD17 Make the document easy to change 7 2 1 0 
 








Security Requirements Documentation Practices
High Medium Low Zero
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We obtained feedback from the organizations targeted by the questionnaire 
regarding some of these practices. For example, they referred to some of the security 
requirements documentation practices, describing them as repetitive and needing to be 
combined into unified practices. For instance, there is a standard to be followed for a 
security requirements document which shares the same structure as this document. Thus, 
there is no need to mention the parts of this standard documentation, such as the security 
objectives document, security requirements rationale document, protection profile 
documents, security problem definition document, risk assessment document, etc. Also, 
we found this part of the feedback helpful, so we combined practices under the definition 
of “standard for security requirements documents.” This led us to reduce the number 
practices of security requirements documents from 17 to 12 as shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2 Security Requirements Documents Practices Chosen by Organizations 
The next series of tables (Table 4.10 through Table 4.16) contain the practices which 
have been chosen by the targeted organizations. We have removed the practices that were 








Revised Security Requirements Documentation Practices
High Medium Low Zero
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Appendix C (Requirement Engineering Security Maturity Model Practices) reflects 
all the practices noted in the questionnaire, Excluding the practices given the value “zero.” 
Table 4.11 Security Requirements Elicitation Practices Chosen by Organizations 
ID Practice 
Type of Assessment 
H M L Z 
SRD1 Assess System Feasibility with respect to security 5 3 2 0 
SRD2 Demonstrate of exploitability  6 2 2 0 
SRD3 Be sensitive to organizational and political 
consideration  
10 0 0 0 
SRD4 
Identify and consult system stakeholders (to agree 
upon a common set of security definitions, 
definition of the organizational security policies and 
the security vision of the IS.)  
10 0 0 0 
SRD5 Identify vulnerable and/or critical assets.  8 2 0 0 
SRD6 Identify security objectives and dependencies.  5 3 2 0 
SRD7 
Identify threats and develop artifacts.  
(such as misuse cases or attack trees diagrams or 
UMLSec use cases and classes or sequence/state 
diagrams)  
8 2 0 0 
SRD8 
Record security requirements sources (Identify 
Resources and Trust Boundaries)  
4 3 3 0 
SRD9 
Define the system’s operating environment  
(Specify Operational Environment) 
5 2 3 0 
SRD10 Identifying User Roles and Resource Capabilities  7 2 1 0 
SRD11 Use business concerns to drive security 
requirements elicitation  
7 1 2 0 
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SRD12 Identify and consult security experts  6 2 2 0 
SRD13 Select an elicitation method using a systematic 
tradeoff analysis approach to elicit security 
requirements  
4 4 2 0 
SRD14 Look for domain constraints  6 2 2 0 
SRD15 Record security requirements rationale  4 3 3 0 
SRD16 
Collect security requirements from multiple 
viewpoints  
5 2 3 0 
SRD17 Prototype poorly understood security requirements  7 2 1 0 
SRD18 Use scenarios to elicit security requirements  8 1 1 0 
SRD19 Define operational processes  3 3 4 0 
SRD20 Reuse security requirements  3 4 3 0 
 
 









Security Requirements elicitation practices
High Medium Low Zero
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Table 4.12 Security Requirements Analysis and Negotiation Practices Chosen by Organizations 
ID Practice 
Type of Assessment 
H M L Z 
SRA1 Define security of system boundaries 10 0 0 0 
SRA2 Use checklists for security requirements analysis 7 2 1 0 
SRA3 Perform Security & Privacy Risk Assessment 9 1 0 0 
SRA4 Negotiate quality gates with different stakeholders 8 2 0 0 
SRA5 Provide software to support negotiations 9 1 0 0 
SRA6 Ensure access requirements are consistent, complete 
and conflict-free. 
7 3 0 0 
SRA7 Prioritize security requirements 8 2 0 0 
SRA8 Classify security requirements using a multi-
dimensional approach 
6 2 2 0 
SRA9 Use interaction matrices to find conflicts and overlaps 7 3 0 0 
SRA10 
Review Security Requirements (review security 
requirements are the confrontation of analysis 
between Analyst and the Security Team analysis) 
8 2 0 0 
 








Security Requirements analysis and negotiation practices
High Medium Low Zero
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Table 4.13 Practices of Describing Security Requirements Chosen by Organizations 
ID Practice 
Type of Assessment 
H M L Z 
DSR1 
Define standard templates for describing security 
requirements 
7 2 1 0 
DSR2 Use languages simply and concisely 10 0 0 0 
DSR3 Be adequate as possible (explicit, precise, complete 
and non-conflicting) 
10 0 0 0 
DSR4 Use diagrams appropriately 10 0 0 0 
DSR5 Describe abuse cases by examples 5 3 0 2 
DSR6 Describe a prototype model for data security based 
on metadata 
8 2 0 0 
DSR7 Supplement natural language with other description 
of security requirement 
7 2 1 0 
DSR8 Specify security requirements quantitatively  6 2 2 0 
 








Describing Practices of Security Requirements
High Medium Low Zero
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H M L Z 
SRM1 Develop complementary system models with 
respect to security 
7 2 1 0 
SRM2 Model the system’s security environment 8 2 0 0 
SRM3 Model the system security architecture 8 2 0 0 
SRM4 Model the threats of system  10 0 0 0 
SRM5 Use security pattern template to model security 
requirements 
7 2 1 0 
SRM6 Use problem frames to model security 
requirements 
4 3 0 3 
SRM7 Use structured methods for system security 
modelling 
8 1 1 0 
SRM8 Use a data dictionary 7 2 1 0 
SRM9 Document the links between stakeholder 
requirements and system models 
6 2 2 0 
SRM10 Clearly define the properties that we hope to 
prevent attackers from violating. 
9 1 0 0 
 








Modelling Practices of Security Requirements
High Medium Low Zero
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Table 4.15 Practices of Validating Security Requirements Chosen by Organizations 
ID Practice 
Type of Assessment 
H M L Z 
SRV1 Check that the security requirements document meets 
your standards 
10 0 0 0 
SRV2 Organize security requirements inspections 10 0 0 0 
SRV3 Use multi-disciplinary teams to review security 
requirements 
8 1 1 0 
SRV4 Define validation checklists 9 1 0 0 
SRV5 Use prototyping to animate security requirements 8 2 0 0 
SRV6 
Perform periodic security assessments and review the 
quality of security activity 
10 0 0 0 
SRV7 Write a draft user manual 8 2 0 0 
SRV8 Propose security requirements test cases 8 2 0 0 
SRV9 Paraphrase system security models 7 2 1 0 
 
 






















Security Requirements Validation Practices
High Medium Low Zero
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Table 4.16 Management Practices of Security Requirements Chosen by Organizations 
ID Practice 
Type of Assessment 
H M L Z 
MSR1 Uniquely identify each security requirement 9 1 0 0 
MSR2 Define policies for security requirements 
management 
10 0 0 0 
MSR3 Define traceability policies 9 1 0 0 
MSR4 Maintain a traceability manual 7 2 1 0 
MSR5 Use a database to manage security requirements 6 2 2 0 
MSR6 Define change management policies 9 1 0 0 
MSR7 Identify global system security requirements 6 2 2 0 
MSR8 Identify volatile security requirements 7 3 0 0 
MSR9 Record rejected security requirements 6 2 2 0 
MSR10 Manage risks of requirements from laws and 
regulations 7 2 1 0 
 






















Security Requirement Management Practices
High Medium Low Zero
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The outcome of the conducted questionnaire is the total number of security 
practices that have been used in different organization. We have removed all the practices 
that were given the value “zero” by the ten organizations since these practices are never 
used by those organizations. Thus, the remaining practices, which were not given the value 
“zero,” have been used to build RESMM.  Table 4.17 shows numbers of security practices 
for each category. There are different goals such as security requirements document goal, 
security requirements elicitation goal, etc. Each of these goals has its own security 
practices. 
Table 4.17 The outcome of the conducted questionnaire (security practices) 
No. Category No. of Security Practices 
1 Security Requirements Document 12 
2 Security Requirements Elicitation 20 
3 Security Requirements Analysis and Negotiation 10 
4 Describing Security Requirements 8 
5 Security System Modelling 10 
6 Security Requirements Validation 9 
7 Security Requirements Management 10 




5 CHAPTER 5 
REQUIREMENT ENGINEERING SECURITY 
MATURITY MODEL 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the development process of Requirements Engineering 
Security Maturity Model (RESMM). First, we present the structure of proposed RESMM, 
then a suitable assessment tool is discussed which can be used to measure requirements 
security maturity of organizations. After that, the RESMM is applied in the real software 
industry via a case study approach, and feedback obtained from the case study organization 
is taken into consideration to improve RESMM. Figure 5.1 shows the development flow 









Figure 5.1 RESMM Development 
Research Questions 
Identify the Security 
Practices at requirements 
phase via:  
SLR  
Identify the Security 
Practices at requirements 
phase via:  
The adapted Sommerville 
Build RESMM 
Evaluate RESMM 
Via Case study  
& post Questionnaire 
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Figure 5.2 shows the full process of development of RESMM with the utilized 
SCAMPI measurement. RESMM consists of different security practices that have been 
conducted based on Sommerville practices and organization practices via questionnaire. 
The outputs of the RESMM, which are security requirements practices classifications, are 








Figure 5.2 The full process of the development of RESMM 
 
5.2 Structure of RESMM 
This section explains the RESMM structure. RESMM is designed to assist software 
development organizations in specifying the requirements for secure software in a better 
way. RESMM structure is motivated by the structure of CMMI. We employed the concepts 
of specific goals, specific practices, and a measurement of maturity capability. In RESMM, 
we have specified generic practices based on the data we obtained from two sources, i.e. 
previous studies and software industry experience. In addition, we have specified the 
practices in order to achieve the generic goals. Figure 5.3 shows the structure of our process 





























Figure 5.3 CMMI process area structure vs RESMM structure 
 
In our case, general goals of the RESMM process will be security requirement 
document, security requirements elicitation, security requirement analysis and negotiation, 
describing security requirement, modeling of security requirement, security requirement 
validation, and security requirement management. Furthermore, each of these general goals 
has its own security practices in order to achieve that goal. Figure 5.4 shows the structure 
of RESMM. 
 
Figure 5.4 RESMM Structure 
 
 















5.2.1 Specific Goal Component 
 
RESMM consists of seven specific goals. Each goal consists of specific security 
practices. Details of the collected security practices identified based on our SLR and 
Sommerville are available in Appendix C (Requirement Engineering Security Maturity 
Model Practices).  
 Seven security requirements categories identified via SLR were classified into 
seven categories. The classification of these security practices was based on the 
Sommerville. Each category consists of some security requirements practices. Table 5.1 
shows the Number of security practices in each category. These practices can be classified 
as follows: security requirements documentation, security requirements elicitation, security 
requirements analysis and negotiation, describing security requirements, security system 
modeling, security requirements validation, security requirements management, and 
security requirements engineering for critical systems. 
Table 5.1 Number of security practices in each category 
No. Category No. of Security Practices 
1 Security Requirements Document 12 
2 Security Requirements Elicitation 20 
3 Security Requirements Analysis and Negotiation 10 
4 Describing Security Requirements 8 
5 Security System Modelling 10 
6 Security Requirements Validation 9 
7 Security Requirements Management 10 
 The Total number of security practices 79 
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The RESMM is a continuous model since we built the RESMM based on a defined 
set of practices that measure the capability levels within each profile. We employed the 
concepts of specific goals, specific practices, and measurements of maturity capability. In 
RESMM, we have specified generic practices. In addition, we have specified the practices 
in order to achieve the generic goals. RESMM is not a staged model since in a staged 
model, we need to consider certain security practices for every maturity level over the 
whole process area. 
5.2.2  Measurement component 
SCAMPI [20] is used to assess organizational process capability compared to 
process standards including CMMI and P-CMM. SCAMPI has been used to assign a 
quality rating of benchmarks, which are relative to CMMI models, containing internal 
process improvements and external capability determinations. SCAMPI also has different 
characteristics such as satisfying all appraisal requirements for CMMI and supporting 
ISO/IEC 15504 assessments. In our case, we have used the structure and concepts of 
SCAMPI appraisal in order to measure the maturity of each specific goal. The SCAMPI 
method requires three aspects to be considered: data gathering, analysis, and storage. 
5.2.3  Rating of RESMM Process Attributes 
To present the levels of achievement of the RESMM process attributes, the ordinal 
rating scale can be defined as follow: [97] 
 N Not achieved: Here the maturity level can be recognized as having little evidence 
or no evidence for security considerations through achieving the attribute concerned 
in the RESMM process. The organization does not seem to care about security in 
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the system at all and does not afford any preparation for security requirements 
engineering. 
 P Partially achieved: The defined attribute in the RESMM is somehow partially 
met. That is, there are signs of partial achievement of the attribute concerned. The 
organization seems to care just a little about security in the system at different 
categories of the RESMM process. 
 L Largely achieved: There are signs of a tangible approach to achieve the attribute 
concerned in the RESMM process. However, some weakness related to this attribute 
may exist in the RESMM process. The organization seems to care for most security 
practices but not all the practices at different categories of the RESMM process. 
 F Fully achieved: There are signs of a thorough and well-organized approach to 
fully achieve the attribute concerned in the RESMM process. No real weaknesses 
are reported to this attribute in the RESMM process. The organization seems to care 
greatly for security practices at different categories of the RESMM process. 
The corresponding quantitative values shall be:  
- N Not achieved: this means the organization has achieved 0 to 15% of the RESMM.  
- P Partially achieved: this means the organization has achieved > 15% to 50% of the 
RESMM. 
- L Largely achieved: this means the organization has achieved > 50% to 85% of the 
RESMM. 





The above range of average values has been identified from a study done by IBM [97]. 
They built a process area called IBM Rational Unified Process (A CMMI Maturity Level 
2 assessment of RUP) [97]. This process was appraised using the measurement described 
above. The same measurement is adopted in this research to measure each specific goal of 
RESMM in order to quantify the outcomes as shown in Table 5.2. The structure of the 
RESMM process area is the same as the CMMI process areas, which contain goals and 
practices to achieve these goals. In our case, the goals are the categories of Sommerville 
which we used in our process area. And there are certain practices for achieving these goals. 
Table 5.2 Structure of SCAMPI Appraisal for RESMM 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Security Requirements documents     
SP1.1 Define a standard security document structure     
SP1.2 Explain how to use the security document     
SP1.3 
Define Security Definitions, Quality Gates and 
Security Policy of the Organization. 
    
SP1.4 
Make a separate Information security policy such 
as: (Access Control Policy, Classification Policy, 
Backup Policy,  ... etc.) 
    
SP1.5 
Define and document a project’s security bug 
bar.  
(establish a minimum level of quality) 
    
SP1.6 Include a summary of the security requirements     
SP1.7 
Make a business case for the system with respect 
to security 
    
SP1.8 Define specialized security terms     
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SP1.8 Make document layout readable     
SP1.10 Develop a security requirements category     
SP1.11 Help readers find information     
SP1.12 Make the document easy to change     
The Summation for each Column     
The total  
Avg. The total/ # of practices 
 
As we mentioned above, we follow the range values that have been used by IBM in their 
RUP process area. Accordingly, we have four range values in our process area (0, 1, 2, and 
3). Thus, in order to convert the percentage values of IBM from to our case values (0, 1, 2, 
or 3), we multiply 0.15*3 to know the corresponding value for 15%, which will be equal 
to 0.45. Also, we multiply 0.50*3 to know the corresponding value for 50% which will be 
equal to 1.5. Moreover, we multiply 0.85*3 to know the corresponding value for 85%, 
which will be equal to 2.55. Thus, if the average value is between 0 and 0.45, this means 
the organization does not have an applicable implementation level [97]. If the average 
value is greater than 0.45 and less than 1.5, this means the organization has a partially 
applicable implementation level. If the average value is greater than 1.5 and less than 2.55, 
this means the organization has a largely applicable implementation level. Finally, if the 
average value is greater than 2.55, this means the organization has a fully applicable 




Table 5.3 Appraisal range of value used by IBM Rational Unified Process 
No. Range value in % by IBM 
Range of Average Value for 
RESMM 
Maturity Level 
1 0 - 15% If       0 <Avg. <= 0.45 Not applicable 
2 15% - 50% If       0.45 <Avg. <= 1.5 Partially applicable 
3 50% - 85% If       1.5 <Avg. <= 2.55 Largely applicable 
4 85% - 100% If       2.55 <Avg. <= 3 Fully applicable 
 
We have adopted the previous implementation level described in Table 5.3 with the 
remaining categories of security practices (elicitation security practices, analysis and 
negotiation of security practices, etc.)  
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6 CHAPTER 6 
CASE STUDY 
6.1 Introduction 
A case study is used to obtain more information about practical examples from the real 
world. In this way, it is possible to clarify information or measure the impact of a certain 
phenomenon. In this research, the case study helps evaluate the RESMM by different 
practitioners in the software industry. It also helps to show the effect of using RESMM in 
real-world software development, identify areas of weakness in the system that need to be 
improved, and show the results of using RESMM in different organizations. 
We communicated with various software development organizations about 
participating in our questionnaire and provided them with information about certain 
security practices which are often ambiguous. In addition, we provided them with a 
reference email so they could contact us regarding any security practice which needed to 
be explained in more detail. After collecting the organizations’ feedback on the 
questionnaire, the RESMM was developed. Then, the RESMM was conducted on two 
software development organizations as a case study, using a SCAMPI appraisal to identify 
the maturity of practices in those organizations. Furthermore, two post-case studies have 




6.2 Result  
Results of the assessments for surveyed organizations are presented in Table 6.1 through 
Table 6.7. Each table represents the maturity of the security practices according to their 
category. Assessment results were also shared with the surveyed organizations to show 
deficiencies of security practices if there were any.  
6.2.1 Organization A 
Organization A refers to one of the two organizations in which we conducted our research 
and is considered as a case study here. It has branches in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. We 
contacted the Saudi branch, which is located in Riyadh. It has around 80 staff members. 
The responses to the questions of the case study were made by a technical team leader with 
ten years of experience in this organization. Recently, he has started developing a system 
for an international bank in Saudi Arabia. One of his duties is to oversee the collected 
requirements, analyze these requirements, and try to come up with the desired software 
ordered by customer.  
6.2.1.1    Assessment Outcomes of Organization A 
Table 6.1 Security Requirements documents coverage for the RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Document Security Requirements     
SP1.1 Define a standard security document structure  1   




Define Security Definitions, Quality Gates and 
security policy of the organization. 
  2  
SP1.4 
Make a separate Information security policy Such 
as: (Access Control Policy, Classification Policy, 
Backup Policy, ... etc.) 
   3 
SP1.5 
Define and document a project’s security bug 
bar.  
(establish a minimum level of quality) 
  2  
SP1.6 Include a summary of the security requirements  1   
SP1.7 
Make a business case for the system with respect 
to security 
  2  
SP1.8 Define specialized security terms   2  
SP1.9 Make document layout readable   2  
SP1.10 Develop a security requirements category    3 
SP1.11 Help readers find information   2  
SP1.12 Make the document easy to change    3 
The Summation for each Column 0 2 14 9 
The total 25 
Avg. 
Avg.= The total/ # of practices 
Avg.= 25/12 = 2.083 
 
Based on Table 6.1, the average of security requirements documents is equal to 2.083, this 
organization has a largely applicable implementation level of security requirements 
documents, but it has not reached the highest maturity level. If the organization wants to 
enhance their security requirements documents practices, they need to implement more of 
these practices. In that case, the average assessment of the RESMM based on security 
requirement documents practices will change. If the average reaches to greater than 2.55, 
this will mean the organization has reached the highest maturity level. 
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Table 6.2 Security Requirements Elicitation coverage for the RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Security Requirements Elicitation     
SP1.1 
Assess System Feasibility with respect to 
security. 
 1   
SP1.2 Demonstrate of exploitability.   1   
SP1.3 
Be sensitive to organizational and political policy 
consideration  
  2  
SP1.4 
Identify and consult system stakeholders (to 
agree upon a common set of security definitions, 
definition of the organizational security policies 
and the security vision of the IS.)  
 1   
SP1.5 Identify vulnerable and/or critical assets.    2  
SP1.6 Identify security objectives and dependencies.    2  
SP1.7 
Identify threats and develop artifacts. 
(such as misuse cases or attack trees diagrams or 
UMLSec use cases, … ) 
  2  
SP1.8 
Record security requirements sources  
(Identify Resources and Trust Boundaries)  
 1   
SP1.9 
Define the system’s operating environment  
(Specify Operational Environment) 
  2  
SP1.10 Identifying User Roles and Resource Capabilities    2  
SP1.11 
Use business concerns to drive security 
requirements elicitation  
 1   
SP1.12 Identify and consult security experts  0    
SP1.13 
Select an elicitation method using a systematic 
tradeoff analysis approach to elicit SR.  
 1   
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SP1.14 Look for domain constraints   1   
SP1.15 Record security requirements rationale    2  
SP1.16 
Collect security requirements from multiple 
viewpoints  
 1   
SP1.17 
Prototype poorly understood security 
requirements  
 1   
SP1.18 Use scenarios to elicit security requirements    2  
SP1.19 Define operational processes   1   
SP1.20 Reuse security requirements  0    
The Summation for each Column 0 10 16 0 
The total 26 
Avg. Avg. = The total/ # of practices 
Avg. = 26/20 = 1.3 
 
Based on Table 6.2, the average of security requirements documents is equal to 1.3, this 
organization has a partially applicable implementation level of security requirements 
elicitation practices. The organization needs to enhance its elicitation practices of security 




Table 6.3 Security Requirements analysis and negotiation coverage for RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Security Requirements analysis and 
negotiation 
    
SP1.1 Define security of system boundaries  1   
SP1.2 Use checklists for security requirements 
analysis 
 1   
SP1.3 Perform Security & Privacy Risk Assessment   2  
SP1.4 





SP1.5 Provide software to support negotiations  1   
SP1.6 Ensures that the access requirements are 
consistent, complete and conflict-free. 
 1   
SP1.7 Prioritize security requirements   2  
SP1.8 
Classify security requirements using a multi-
dimensional approach 
 1   
SP1.9 
Use interaction matrices to find conflicts and 
overlaps 
 1   
SP1.10 Review Security Requirements   1   
The Summation for each Column 0 8 4 0 
The total 12 
Avg. Avg. = The total/ # of practices 
Avg. = 12/10 = 1.2 
 
Based on Table 6.3 the average of security requirements documents is equal to 1.2, this 
organization has a partially applicable implementation level of security requirements 
analysis and negotiation practices. 
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Table 6.4 Describing Security Requirements coverage for the RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Describing Security Requirements     
SP1.1 
Define standard templates for describing 
security requirements 
  2  
SP1.2 Use languages simply and concisely    3 
SP1.3 
Be adequate as possible (explicit, precise, 
complete and non-conflicting) 
  2  
SP1.4 Use diagrams appropriately   2  
SP1.5 
Describe a prototype model for data security 
based on metadata 
0    
SP1.6 Describe abuse cases by examples 0    
SP1.7 
Supplement natural language with other 
description of security requirement 
  2  
SP1.8 Specify security requirements quantitatively   2  
The Summation for each Column 0 0 10 3 
The total 13 
Avg. 
Avg. = The total/ # of practices 
Avg. = 13/8 = 1.625 
 
Based on Table 6.4, the average of security requirements documents is equal to 1.625, this 
organization has a largely applicable implementation level of describing security 
requirements practices.  
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Table 6.5 Security System Modeling coverage for the RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Security System Modelling     
SP1.1 
Develop complementary system models with 
respect to security 
 1   
SP1.2 Model the system’s security environment  1   
SP1.3 Model the system security architecture   2  
SP1.4 Model the Threats of System   1   
SP1.5 Use security pattern template to model SR  1   
SP1.6 Use problem frames to model security 
requirements 
0    
SP1.7 
Use structured methods for system security 
modelling 
  2  
SP1.8 Use a data dictionary  1   
SP1.9 
Document the links between stakeholder 
requirements and system models 
 1   
SP1.10 
Clearly define the properties that we hope to 
prevent attackers from violating. 
  2  
The Summation for each Column 0 6 6  
The total 12 
Avg. Avg. = The total/ # of practices 
Avg. = 12/10 = 1.2 
Based on Table 6.5, the average of security requirements documents is equal to 1.2, this 




Table 6.6 Security Requirements Validation coverage for the RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Security Requirements Validation     
SP1.1 
Check that the security requirements document 
meets your standards 
 1   
SP1.2 Organize security requirements inspections  1   
SP1.3 
Use multi-disciplinary teams to review security 
requirements 
0    
SP1.4 Define validation checklists  1   
SP1.5 Use prototyping to animate security 
requirements 
  2  
SP1.6 
Perform periodic security assessments and 
review the quality of security activity 
 1   
SP1.7 Write a draft user manual 0    
SP1.8 Propose security requirements test cases  1   
SP1.9 Paraphrase system security models  1   
The Summation for each Column 0 6 2 0 
The total 8 
Avg. Avg. = The total/ # of practices 
Avg. = 8/9 = 0.89 
Based on Table 6.6, the average of security requirements documents is equal to 0.89, this 





Table 6.7 Security Requirements Management coverage for the RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Security Requirements Management     
SP1.1 Uniquely identify each security requirement  1   
SP1.2 
Define policies for security requirements 
management 
   
3 
SP1.3 Define traceability policies  1   
SP1.4 Maintain a traceability manual   2  
SP1.5 Use a database to manage security requirements  1   
SP1.6 Define change management policies   2  
SP1.7 Identify global system security requirements   2  
SP1.8 Identify volatile security requirements  1   
SP1.9 Record rejected security requirements   2  
SP1.10 
Manage risks of requirements from laws and 
regulations 
0 
   
The Summation for each Column 0 4 8 3 
The total 15 
Avg. Avg. = The total/ # of practices 
Avg. = 15/9 = 1.66 
Based on Table 6.7 the average of security requirements documents is equal to 1.66, this 




6.2.1.2    Assessment of Organization A Results 
Organization A has maturity limitation in some RESMM areas. It has obtained a 
score of 1.3 for SR elicitation, 1.2 for SR analysis and negotiation, 1.33 for SR modeling, 
and 0.89 for SR validation. By contrast, it has secured an acceptable level of maturity in 
other areas. It has obtained 2.083 for SR documentation, 1.625 for describing of SR, and 
1.66 for SR management. This indicates that some areas such as elicitation, analysis and 
negotiation, modeling, and validation need to be improved in order to reach a higher 
maturity level. However, their documentation of SR is good since the score is very high 
(almost mature). This information was helpful for understanding which areas need to be 
improved.  
After we measured the maturity level of security practices in Organization A, we 
sent a report to the organization to show them their areas of weakness and their areas of 
strength according to the implemented practices that the organization performed.                        
Table 6.8 summarizes the results of the assessment for Organization A. 
Table 6.8 Summary table of maturity security practices of organization A 
No. Security practice category Avg. 
Appraisal of Organization 
A Using SCAMPI 
1 Security requirements documentation 2.083 Largely applicable 
2 Security requirements elicitation 1.3 Partially applicable 
3 Security requirements analysis and negotiation 1.2 Partially applicable 
4 Describing Security requirements 1.625 Largely applicable 
5 Security System Modelling 1.2 Partially applicable 
6 Security requirements validation 0.89 Partially applicable 
7 Security requirements Management 1.66 Largely applicable 
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6.2.2 Organization B 
Another case study was conducted at a different software development organization, which 
we call “Organization B” here. It is located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This organization is 
engaged in application development. They advocate for various companies by developing 
services in different areas, such as application performance management (APM), 
application/software development, contact centre business units, decision support system 
(DSS), market development, product development, security application solutions & 
services, and cloud IP telephony service. They help customers to promote their businesses 
more effectively through the intelligent and creative use of latest technologies, techniques, 
and practices. Organization B has more than 650 employees. They have a long experience 
in Saudi Arabia and other countries. They provide full IT projects by designing, executing, 
and managing projects with an aim to provide effective and valuable solutions to 
customers. They have been awarded a certificate in CMMI Maturity Level 3. The responder 
of our case study was an application development manager with twelve years of experience 
in software analysis. One of his duties is to furnish end-user requirements and make sure 




6.2.2.1    Assessment Outcomes of Organization B 
Table 6.9 Security Requirements documents coverage for the RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Security Requirements documents     
SP1.1 Define a standard security document structure     3 
SP1.2 Explain how to use the security document     3 
SP1.3 Define Security Definitions, Quality Gates and 
security policy of the organization. 
  2   
SP1.4 
Make a separate Information security policy Such 
as: (Access Control Policy, Classification Policy, 
Backup Policy, ... etc.) 
    3 
SP1.5 
Define and document a project’s security bug 
bar.  
(establish a minimum level of quality) 
  2   
SP1.6 Include a summary of the security requirements     3 
SP1.7 Make a business case for the system with respect 
to security 
  2   
SP1.8 Define specialized security terms     3 
SP1.9 Make document layout readable   2   
SP1.10 Develop a security requirements category   2 3 
SP1.11 Help readers find information   2   
SP1.12 Make the document easy to change     3 
The Summation for each Column 0 0 12 21 
The total 33 
Avg. Avg.= The total/ # of practices 
Avg.= 33/12 = 2.75 
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Based on Table 6.9, the average of security requirements documents is equal to 2.75, this 
organization has a fully applicable implementation level of security requirements 
documents. The organization B has reached to greater than 2.55 of implementing security 
requirements documents, this mean that the organization B has reached the highest maturity 
level. 
Table 6.10 Security Requirements Elicitation coverage for the RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Security Requirements Elicitation     
SP1.1 Assess System Feasibility with respect to 
security. 
 1   
SP1.2 Demonstrate of exploitability.   2  
SP1.3 
Be sensitive to organizational and political policy 
consideration  
  2  
SP1.4 
Identify and consult system stakeholders (to 
agree upon a common set of security definitions, 
definition of the organizational security policies 
and the security vision of the IS.)  
   3 
SP1.5 Identify vulnerable and/or critical assets.    2  
SP1.6 Identify security objectives and dependencies.    2  
SP1.7 
Identify threats and develop artifacts. 
(such as misuse cases or attack trees diagrams or 
UMLSec use cases ... ) 
  2  
SP1.8 
Record security requirements sources  
(Identify Resources and Trust Boundaries)  
 1   
SP1.9 
Define the system’s operating environment  
(Specify Operational Environment) 
  2  




Use business concerns to drive security 
requirements elicitation  
 1   
SP1.12 Identify and consult security experts   1   
SP1.13 
Select an elicitation method using a systematic 
tradeoff analysis approach to elicit SR.  
  2  
SP1.14 Look for domain constraints    2  
SP1.15 Record security requirements rationale    2  
SP1.16 
Collect security requirements from multiple 
viewpoints  
 1   
SP1.17 Prototype poorly understood security 
requirements  
 1   
SP1.18 Use scenarios to elicit security requirements    2  
SP1.19 Define operational processes    2  
SP1.20 Reuse security requirements   1   
The Summation for each Column 0 7 24 3 
The total 34 
Avg. Avg. = The total/ # of practices 
Avg. = 34/20 = 1.7 
 
 
Based on Table 6.10, the average of security requirements documents is equal to 1.7, this 
organization has a largely applicable implementation level of security requirements 
elicitation practices. The organization B needs to enhance its elicitation practices of 




Table 6.11 Security Requirements analysis and negotiation coverage for RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Security Requirements analysis and negotiation     
SP1.1 Define security of system boundaries   2  
SP1.2 Use checklists for security requirements analysis  1   
SP1.3 Perform Security & Privacy Risk Assessment   2  
SP1.4 Negotiate quality gates with different stakeholders   2  
SP1.5 Provide software to support negotiations  1   
SP1.6 Ensures that the access requirements are consistent, 
complete and conflict-free. 
  2  
SP1.7 Prioritize security requirements    3 
SP1.8 
Classify security requirements using a multi-
dimensional approach 
 1   
SP1.9 Use interaction matrices to find conflicts and 
overlaps 
 1   
SP1.10 
Review Security Requirements (review security 
requirements is the confrontation of analysis 




The Summation for each Column 0 4 8 6 
The total 18 
Avg. Avg. = The total/ # of practices 
Avg. = 18/10 = 1.8 
Based on Table 6.11 the average of security requirements documents is equal to 1.8, this 




Table 6.12 Describing Security Requirements coverage for the RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Describing Security Requirements     
SP1.1 
Define standard templates for describing security 
requirements 
   3 
SP1.2 Use languages simply and concisely   2  
SP1.3 
Be adequate as possible (explicit, precise, complete 
and non-conflicting) 
   3 
SP1.4 Use diagrams appropriately   2  
SP1.5 
Describe a prototype model for data security based 
on metadata 
 1   
SP1.6 Describe abuse cases by examples 0    
SP1.7 
Supplement natural language with other description 
of security requirement 
  2  
SP1.8 Specify security requirements quantitatively  1   
The Summation for each Column 0 2 6 6 
The total 14 
Avg. 
Avg. = The total/ # of practices 
Avg. = 14/8 = 1.75 
 
Based on Table 6.12, the average of security requirements documents is equal to 1.75, this 





Table 6.13 Security System Modeling coverage for the RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Security System Modelling     
SP1.1 
Develop complementary system models with 
respect to security 
  2  
SP1.2 Model the system’s security environment    3 
SP1.3 Model the system security architecture  1   
SP1.4 Model the Threats of System     3 
SP1.5 Use security pattern template to model SRs. 0    
SP1.6 Use problem frames to model security requirements 0    
SP1.7 Use structured methods for system security 
modelling 
   3 
SP1.8 Use a data dictionary 0    
SP1.9 
Document the links between stakeholder 
requirements and system models 
  2  
SP1.10 
Clearly define the properties that we hope to 
prevent attackers from violating. 
 1   
The Summation for each Column 0 2 4 9 
The total 15 
Avg. Avg. = The total/ # of practices 
Avg. = 15/10 = 1.5 
Based on Table 6.13 the average of security requirements documents is equal to 1.5, this 




Table 6.14 Security Requirements Validation coverage for the RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Security Requirements Validation     
SP1.1 
Check that the security requirements document 
meets your standards 
  2  
SP1.2 Organize security requirements inspections    3 
SP1.3 
Use multi-disciplinary teams to review security 
requirements 
0    
SP1.4 Define validation checklists 0    
SP1.5 Use prototyping to animate security requirements 1    
SP1.6 
Perform periodic security assessments and review 
the quality of security activity 
   3 
SP1.7 Write a draft user manual 0    
SP1.8 Propose security requirements test cases   2  
SP1.9 Paraphrase system security models 0    
The Summation for each Column 0 1 4 6 
The total 11 
Avg. Avg. = The total/ # of practices 
Avg. = 11/9 = 1.222 
 
Based on Table 6.14, the average of security requirements documents is equal to 1.222, 





Table 6.15 Security Requirements Management coverage for the RESMM process area 
ID Practices 
Implementation Level 
Not Partially Largely Fully 
0 1 2 3 
SG1 Security Requirements Management     
SP1.1 Uniquely identify each security requirement    3 
SP1.2 Define policies for security requirements 
management 
   3 
SP1.3 Define traceability policies    3 
SP1.4 Maintain a traceability manual   2  
SP1.5 Use a database to manage security requirements   2  
SP1.6 Define change management policies    3 
SP1.7 Identify global system security requirements   2  
SP1.8 Identify volatile security requirements    3 
SP1.9 Record rejected security requirements    3 
SP1.10 Manage risks of requirements from laws and 
regulations 
   3 
The Summation for each Column 0 0 6 21 
The total 27 
Avg. 
Avg. = The total/ # of practices 
Avg. = 27/10 = 2.7 
 
Based on Table 6.15 the average of security requirements documents is equal to 2.7, this 




6.2.2.2    Assessment of Organization B Results 
Organization B has good maturity in most areas of RESMM. It has obtained a score 
of 2.75 for SR documentation, 1.7 for SR elicitation, 1.8 for SR analysis and negotiation, 
1.75 for describing of SR, and 1.9 for SR management. By contrast, the organization has 
maturity limitation in some other areas, such as SR modeling and SR validation. It has 
obtained 1.2 for SR modeling, and 1.222 for SR validation. This indicates that some areas, 
such as SR modeling and SR validation, need to be improved in order to reach a higher 
maturity level. However, their documentation of SR is good since the score is very high 
(almost mature). This information was helpful for understanding which areas needed to be 
improved.  
After we measured the maturity level of security practices with Organization B, we 
sent them a report to show them their areas of weakness and strength according to the 
implemented practices that the organization performed. Table 6.16 summarizes the results 
of the assessment for Organization A. 
Table 6.16 Summary table of maturity security practices of organization B 
No. Security practice category Avg. 
Appraisal of Organization 
A Using SCAMPI 
1 Security requirements documentation 2.75 Fully applicable 
2 Security requirements elicitation 1.7 Largely applicable 
3 Security requirements analysis and negotiation 1.8 Largely applicable 
4 Describing Security requirements 1.75 Largely applicable 
5 Security System Modelling 1.5 Partially applicable 
6 Security requirements validation 1.222 Partially applicable 
7 Security requirements documentation 2.7 Fully applicable 
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6.3 Evaluation of RESMM 
After we built RESMM, we evaluated this model in the real-world environment. Two case 
studies were conducted with two software organizations. The SPI managers from these 
organizations were invited to participate in this study. The SPI managers agreed to 
participate as they were interested in evaluating their RE processes with respect to maturity 
of RE security practices. These managers were provided with full documentation of the 
RESMM with complete notes about how to use RESMM.   
After completing the case studies, the respondents were asked to fulfill the post-case study 
questionnaire to evaluate RESMM in the real-world environment. The feedback of the 
RESMM evaluation was considered to find which part of RESMM needed to be improved.  
6.4 Evaluation Criteria 
Based on [98], there are two success criteria that need to be achieved to assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of the RE practices within the model. These success criteria are user 
satisfaction and ease-of-use. Beside to these two success criteria, we are also concerned 
with the structure of the created model. We need to see if there are any comments about 
the structure of our model. Thus, we have used the following criteria to evaluate RESMM:  
 Structure of the RESMM: This criterion identifies any flaws on RESMM structure 
and ways to enhance RESMM structure. 
 Usability: This criterion assesses how easy it is to use RESMM. It also evaluates 
RESMM structure and improves the ease-of-use of RESMM. In order to avoid 
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building a complex model, we need RESMM to be unambiguous and more flexible 
to users, because complex models require higher effort and training.  
 User satisfaction: This criterion assesses the achievement of specified users’ goals 
according to user needs and expectations of RESMM without confusion or 
ambiguity. 
6.5 Feedback Summary 
 As has been thoroughly explained in the previous section and in Table 6.1 through 
Table 6.7.  Organization A has some limitation of maturity in some areas, such as security 
requirements elicitation practices, security requirements analysis and negotiation practices, 
modeling security requirements practices, and validating security requirements practices. 
The organization has some acceptable level of maturity in some areas such as security 
requirements documents practices, describing security requirements practices, and 
management of security requirements practices. After we measured the maturity level of 
security practices with Organization A, we sent a report to the organization to show them 
their areas of weakness and their areas of strength according to the implemented practices 
that the organization performed. The feedback submitted by respondents of Organization 
A has been used to evaluate various aspects of the RESMM. As mentioned in the RESMM 
development section, there are three success criteria (RESMM structure, usability, and user 
satisfaction). We have used a quantitative measurement to evaluate these success criteria. 
Furthermore, we have also provided some questions to gather the participants’ reviews, 
any modifications of RESMM, or any suggestions for enhancing RESMM.  
We have adopted the tables for each success criteria from a study by Yusuf et al. [99]. 
First, we adopted a table for the ease of learning of RESMM and asked Organization A to 
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evaluate the ease of learning of RESMM. Based on Table 6.17, Organization A positively 
agreed that RESMM is easy to comprehend and learn. However, there is still a need for 
some training to grasp how to of utilize RESMM accurately. In spite of that, the 
practitioners involved in the questionnaire were familiar with the process of requirements 
engineering and security techniques, as they had taken some courses in security 
requirements engineering.   
Table 6.17 Ease of Learning Evaluation of Organization A & B 
No. Ease of Learning 
Organizations’ viewpoint (n=2) 
+ - Neutral 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree % Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree % Neutral % 
1) RESMM representation is easy to learn. 0 2 100 % 0 0 0 0 0 
2) Having basic knowledge at least about 
security requirements engineering is 
necessary to be able to use RESMM. 
0 2 100 % 0 0 0 0 0 
3) It is necessary to learn the practices 
arranged for each security requirement 
category.  
0 2 100 % 0 0 0 0 0 
4) The assessment method SCAMPI needs to 
be understood. 
0 2 100 % 0 0 0 0 0 
5)  It is substantial to use RESMM to measure 
organization’s maturity for security 
requirement engineering practices.  
0 2 100 % 0 0 0 0 0 
6)  It is necessary to classify security 
requirement practices into different 
categories, e.g. SR documentation 
practices, SR elicitation practices, etc. 
0 2 100 % 0 0 0 0 0 
7) Some kind of training is necessary to 
facilitate the utilization of RESMM. 
0 2 100 % 0 0 0 0 0 
 The second success criterion is user satisfaction. It assesses users’ satisfaction 
based on the outcome of RESMM. As shown in Table 6.18, Organization A agrees on the 
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usefulness of RESMM and recommends that other organizations apply RESMM. It has 
reflected interest in applying RESMM in its own work. Organization A’s staff are 
convinced about RESMM's capability for the discovery of weakness areas that need to be 
improved. 
Table 6.18 User Satisfaction Evaluation of Organizations A & B 
No. Ease of Learning 
Organizations’ perception (n=2) 
+ - Neutral 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree % Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree % Neutral % 
1) RESMM can be carried out in most 
organizations. 0 2 
100% 0 0 0 0 0 
2) Each practice is clear and easy to learn. 0 2 
100% 0 0 0 0 0 
3) RESMM can identify the areas of 
weakness and the areas of strength in 
organizations with respect to security 
requirements engineering practices which 
they cover. 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
4) Using RESMM would enhance the 
security requirements engineering. 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
5) If RESMM were accessible in my 
occupation, I expect to utilize it.  
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
6) I agree with the maturity issues identified 
by RESMM. 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
7) Using RESMM as an automated software 
tool is critical to persuade security 
requirements engineering in measuring 
an organization’s maturity. 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The third success criterion is the structural aspect of the RESMM. Table 6.19 shows the 
evaluation of RESMM structure by Organization A and Organization B. Their positive 
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responses indicate that that the RESMM structure was very clear, considering that we 
followed CMMI structure. They mentioned that the classification of security practices into 
different categories was very helpful and that each practice was put under a suitable 
category to avoid confusion. Based on their feedback, RESMM can be used effectively to 
measure the security maturity of software development organizations. 
Table 6.19 RESMM Structure Evaluation of Organization A & B 
No. Ease of Learning 
Organizations’ perception (n=2) 
+ - Neutral 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree % Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree % Neutral % 
1) Every RESMM category is self-
explanatory and requires no further 
clarification for adequate utilization. 
2 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
2) Every RESMM category is feasible and 
suited to the security requirements 
engineering process. 
2 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
3) RESMM can be used effectively to 
identify security requirements 
engineering weakness areas with an aim 
to increase organization’s maturity for 
security requirements engineering. 
2 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
4) The distribution of security practices 
among various categories (e.g. 
Documentation, Elicitation, Analysis, 
etc.) is valuable. 
2 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
5) The seven categories of RESMM are 
valuable. 
2 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
 
As for the suggestions offered in the feedback from the organizations, we received a few 
from Organization B only. Table 6.20 shows the feedback results of Organizations A and 
B. One of their suggestions was to provide more clarification for a few practices. Another 
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suggestion was to enhance the questionnaire of the case study so that the maturity level of 
the organization could be calculated in the same form that the respondents fill out for the 
questionnaire. This was resolved by using an Excel sheet to meet this purpose. In fact, there 
has not been much modification on the developed model since the model was built based 
on the feedback obtained from the respondents of the first questionnaire (10 organizations) 





Organization B  
Do you think there is a 
missing category that need to 
be added to RESMM?  Please 
provide the reason for your 
answer. 




Do you suggest any 
improvement for RESMM? 
No Need to make a clarification for 
some practices. For clarity, it would 
be better to show a note for certain 
practices to avoid any confusion, 
especially for those who have no 
background on security 
requirement engineering. 
Positive 
Are there any comments about 
the assessment method? 
No Made an excel sheet to calculate 
the average values of each category 
immediately instead of sending the 
report after the organization sends 
their feedback by email. 
Positive 
Is there any wrong 
classification of security 
requirement practices among 
the various categories? 







Table 6.21 shows the practices that need to be explained more: 
Table 6.21 More explanation for some of the Practices 
No. Before After Adding Explanation for that practice 
1 Make a separate Information 
security policy 
Make a separate information security policy, 
such as (Access Control Policy, Classification 
Policy, Backup Policy, etc.) 
2 Identify threats and develop 
artifacts. 
Identify threats and develop artifacts, such as 
(misuse cases or attack tree diagrams or 
UMLSec use cases and classes or sequence/state 
diagrams) 
3 
Review Security Requirements 
Review Security Requirements (review security 
requirements is the confrontation of analysis 
between Analyst and the Security Team 
analysis) 
4 Define Security Definitions, 
Quality Gates. 
Quality gates are basically acceptance criteria 
reviews that can be used throughout any project. 
 
 
6.6 Case Study Lessons Learned 
There are several lessons learned through the cases study on RESMM. First of all, 
we have learned how to develop a well-structured and organized questionnaire that could 
contribute to positive feedback from respondents.  
Second, the results obtained from this research might guide researchers to have 
prior knowledge about the different viewpoints toward various security practices from both 
researchers’ and practitioners’ perspectives. Doing so is important to ensure that we collect 
accurate security practices which will be adopted in the development of RESMM. To gain 
practitioners’ opinions, a well-structured questionnaire could be an excellent medium to 
obtain the information required.  
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Third, we have found that there is a need to promote basic knowledge of security 
practices among software engineers so they can identify and assess areas of weaknesses in 
organizations for improvement purposes. Organizations will be better informed about the 
maturity of security in their software if more focus and attention is given to dissemination 
of security practices information among their staff.  
Fourth, from the development of the case study, we have learned that it is important 
to take into consideration the lack of knowledge about security practices and that the case 
study should be as simple as possible. Some security practices could be explained in more 
detail rather than putting them in tables without further explanation. This will ensure 
positive interaction with potential software organizations’ staff. This will also ensure 
obtaining accurate answers for the questions asked.  
Lastly, the feedback we obtained from the respondents in the case study has been important 
to improve the RESMM which will ensure its applicability in software organizations.  
6.7 Threats to validity  
This research has some limitation due to conducting a SLR in just three database 
sources (ScienceDirect, IEEE, ACM). Our reasoning was that if there were different 
security practices existing in different databases, we might not consider them while 
conducting SLR. Thus, some studies could have been missed. Nevertheless, we believe our 
outcomes cover the most relevant published literature, and moreover, doing the 
questionnaire with ten organizations also has helped in avoiding this problem. The 
questionnaire has provided us with the most widely used security practices from different 
organizations. Thus, if there are any practices that may be missed in doing SLR, the 
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questionnaire will fill that gap. And it will give us confidence in the reliability of the 
collected data. 
Another limitation is that some software organizations were either not willing to 
provide feedback on the questionnaire or they were not aware of security practices and how 
to answer the questionnaire. To overcome this limitation, we provided more information 
about security practices and the objective of our questionnaire and research in an email to 
those software organizations. To our surprise, some software organizations still did not 
provide their feedback on the questionnaire. However, there might be a need to conduct 
more questionnaires with more organizations around the world in order to generalize the 
outcome of security practices that will be used in the construction of RESMM. That is so 
because the sizes of organizations are important for collecting more information about the 
security practices used in those organizations.  
Another limitation might be that the case study using SCAMPI appraisals only 
involves two organizations. This is attributed to the restricted cooperation of organizations 
as explained above. However, there might be a need to conduct more case studies with 
different organizations in order to check the applicability of RESMM.  
Moreover, since CMMI v1.3 was developed with the waterfall approach, RESMM 
has worked well with the waterfall approach. In fact, RESMM isn’t customized to the Agile 
approach. The scope and limited space of this study does not allow us to discuss all aspects 
of applying RESMM with Agile methodology. If we want to check which practices will 
still be valid with the Agile methodology, we have to make more case studies with different 
organizations who use this methodology to come up with certain security practices that are 
consistent with Agile methodology.   
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7 CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 Conclusion 
This research has aimed to develop the Requirements Engineering Security 
Maturity Model (RESMM) to assist software development organizations in better 
specifying requirements for secure software. Software organizations are expected to be 
able to identify their areas of weaknesses with respect to security practices classification, 
and this in turn will help these organizations to enhance their software to be secure. 
A systematic Literature Review (SLR) was an important part of this research. It 
aimed to review the most common security practices at the requirement phase. As part of 
the SLR, 96 primary studies were reviewed in detail to consider existing security practices 
at the requirements phase. Eventually, the security requirements classifications were 
utilized in the development of RESMM. 
The RESMM has a structure which contains security practices at the requirement 
phase. This research presented the RESMM with seven categories of security practices; 
each category contains various security practices which are related to that category in 
RESMM. Moreover, a questionnaire is administered to different ten organizations to verify 
the collection practices which we found from the SLR. 
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The results of the questionnaire from 10 organizations have helped in building 
RESMM. Some security practices have moved from one category to another. These 
changes have enhanced the usability and applicability of the RESMM to assess software 
development organizations in better specifying the requirements for secure software.  
To assess the usability of the RESMM, two post-case studies were conducted with 
two software organizations that specialize in software development and have several 
branches in Saudi Arabia. The results of each case study were precisely analyzed.  
This work will assist software development organizations in better specifying 
requirements for secure software. In addition, the outcomes of this research will provide 
software development organizations with the ability to measure their maturity of specifying 
requirements for secure software. This work will put software development organizations 
in a better position to deliver software that is more secure. 
The contribution of this study is to develop RESMM that assists software 
development organizations in better specifying requirements for secure software. In 
addition, we have employed practical and evidence-based approaches to the development 





Taking into consideration the growing need for software development, this research 
offers some potential suggestions for future research.  
- There is a need to consider the interaction between RESMM process areas and CMMI 
process areas.   
- New technologies such as Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud computing have certain 
attributes of practices that have not been taken into account in this research. There 
have been very few organizations that were cooperative and agreed to engage in this 
research. 
- There might be a need to conduct SLR with other database sources to ensure full 
coverage of existing security practices at the requirement phase. 
- There is potential in enhancing RESMM by applying it in different organizations and 
carefully analyzing the feedback to enhance the construction of the Requirement 
Engineering Security Maturity Model. 
- The RESMM has been built and customized with waterfall methodology. There might 
be a need to consider what are the security practices that can be chosen from RESMM 
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IN THE NEXT TABLE, THE COULMN PRACTICE TYPE REPRESENTED BY: 
A : Security Requirements documents practices 
B : Security Requirements elicitation practices  
C : Security Requirements analysis and negotiation practices 
D : Describing Security Requirements Practices 
E : Security System Modelling Practices 
F : Security Requirements Validation Practices 
G : Security Requirements Management Practices 
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2. Appendix B (Altered Sommerville RE Practices to SRE practices)  
2.1. Security Requirement Documentation Practices 
No Practices 
1 Define a standard security document structure 
2 Explain how to use the security document 
3 Include a summary of the security requirements 
4 Make a business case for the system with respect to security 
5 Define specialized security terms 
6 Make document layout readable 
7 Use languages simply and concisely to explain security requirement. 
(identification/authentication/authorization/ immunity/privacy/integrity) 
8 Help readers find information 
 
2.2. Security Requirement Elicitation Practices 
No Practices 
1 Assess System Security Feasibility 
2 Take into consideration organizational and political issues 
3 Determine and consult stakeholders of the system 
4 Record security requirements sources 
5 Identify the operating environment of the system 
6 Use concerns related to business to motivate security requirements elicitation 
7 Search for domain constraints 
8 Record rationale for security requirements  
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9 Gather security requirements from different and various views  
10 Prototype poorly understood security requirements 
11 Use hypothetical cases to elicit security requirements 
12 Identify operational processes 
13 Reuse security requirements 
 
2.3. Security Requirements analysis and negotiation Practices 
No Practices 
1 Define security of system boundaries 
2 Make use of checklists to analyze security requirements  
3 Provide software to support negotiations 
4 Consider conflicts and how to resolve them 
5 Identify priorities in security requirements 
6 Sort out security requirements through a multi-dimensional approach 
7 Employ interaction matrices to identify conflicts and overlaps 





2.4. Describing Security Requirement Practices 
No Practices 
1 Identify standard templates to describe security requirements 
2 Use simple and concise languages  
3 Use diagrams appropriately 
4 Supplement natural language with other description of security requirement 
5 Identify quantitative/ qualitative requirements of security  
 
2.5. System Security Modelling Practices  
No Practices 
1 Develop system models that are complementary  
2 Model the system’s security environment 
3 Model the system security architecture 
4 Use structured methods for system security modelling 
5 Use a data dictionary 





2.6. Security Requirement Validation Practices 
No Practices 
1 Make sure the security requirements document satisfies your standards 
2 Organize inspections for security requirements 
3 Use multi-disciplinary teams to assess security requirements 
4 Identify validation checklists 
5 Use prototyping to animate security requirements  
6 Write a draft user manual 
7 Suggest test cases for security requirements  
8 Paraphrase system security models 
 
2.7. Security Requirement Management Practices 
No Practices 
1  Specifically define each security requirement 
2 Identify policies for management security requirements  
3 Define traceability policies  
4 Maintain a traceability manual  
5 Make use of a database to handle security requirements  
6 Define policies for change management  
7 Identify global system security requirements 
8 Identify volatile security requirements 




2.8. Security Requirement Engineering for Critical Systems Practices 
No Practices 
1 Develop checklists for safety requirement  
2 Engage external reviewers in the validation process 
3 Identify and analyze hazards  
4 Obtain safety requirements from hazard analysis 
5 Cross-check operational and functional requirements against safety requirement 
6 Specify systems using a formal specification 
7 Collect incident experience 
8 Learn from incident experience 





3. Appendix C (Requirement Engineering Security Maturity Model Practices) 
Security Requirement Documentation 
Practices 
Security Requirement Elicitation Practices 
1 
Define a standard security document 
structure 
5 
Identify security objectives and 
dependencies.  
2 
Explain how to use the security 
document 
6 Identify and consult system stakeholders  
3 
Define Security Definitions, Quality 
Gates and security policy of the Org. 
7 Identify threats and develop artifacts.  
4 
Make a separate Information security 
policy  
8 
Record security requirements sources  
(Identify Resources and Trust 
Boundaries)  
5 
Define and document a project’s 
security bug bar. (establish a 
minimum level of quality) 
9 
Define the system’s operating 
environment   
(Specify Operational Environment) 
6 
Include a summary of the security 
requirements 
10 
Identifying User Roles and Resource 
Capabilities  
7 
Make a business case for the system 
with respect to security 
11 
Use business concerns to drive security 
requirements elicitation  
8 Define specialized security terms 12 Identify and consult security experts  
9 Make document layout readable 13 
Select an elicitation method using a 
systematic tradeoff analysis approach to 
elicit SRs  
10 Use languages  14 Look for domain constraints  
11 Help readers find information 15 Record security requirements rationale  
12 Make the document easy to change 16 
Collect security requirements from 
multiple viewpoints  
Security Requirement Elicitation 
Practices 
17 
Prototype poorly understood security 
requirements  
1 
Assess System Feasibility with 
respect to security. 
18 
Use scenarios to elicit security 
requirements  
2 Demonstrate of exploitability.  19 Define operational processes  
3 
Be sensitive to organizational and 
political policy consideration  
20 Reuse security requirements  
4 





Security Requirements analysis and 
negotiation Practices 
Security Requirement Modelling Practices 
1 Define security of system boundaries 1 
Develop complementary system models 
with respect to security 
2 Use checklists for SRs analysis 2 
Model the system’s security 
environment 
3 
Perform Security & Privacy Risk 
Assessment 
3 Model the system security architecture 
4 
Ensures that the access requirements are 
consistent, complete and conflict-free. 
4 
Use security pattern template to model 
SRs 
5 
Use interaction matrices to find 
conflicts and overlaps 
5 Model the Threats of System 
6 
Negotiate quality gates with different 
stakeholders 
6 
Use structured methods for system 
security modelling 
7 Prioritize security requirements 7 Use problem frames to model SRs 
8 
Classify security requirements using a 
multi-dimensional approach 
8 Use a data dictionary 
9 
Provide software to support 
negotiations 
9 
Document the links between stakeholder 
requirements and system models 
10 Review Security Requirements  10 
Clearly define the properties that we 
hope to prevent attackers from violating. 




Define standard templates for 
describing SRs. 
  
2 Use languages simply and concisely   
3 
Be adequate as possible (explicit, 
precise, complete and non-conflicting) 
  
4 Use diagrams appropriately   
5 
Describe a prototype model for data 
security based on metadata 
  
6 Describe abuse cases by examples   
7 
Supplement natural language with 
other description of SRs. 
  
8 





Security Requirements Validation 
Practices 
Security Requirements Management 
Practices 
1 
Check that the security requirements 
document meets your standards 
1 
Uniquely identify each security 
requirement 
2 
Organize security requirements 
inspections 
2 
Define policies for security requirements 
management 
3 
Use multi-disciplinary teams to 
review SRs. 
3 Define traceability policies 
4 Define validation checklists 4 Maintain a traceability manual 
5 
Use prototyping to animate security 
requirements 
5 Use a database to manage SRs 
6 
Perform periodic security assessments 
and review the quality of security 
activity 
6 Define change management policies 
7 Write a draft user manual 7 
Identify global system security 
requirements 
8 
Propose security requirements test 
cases 
8 Identify volatile security requirements 
9 Paraphrase system security models 9 Record rejected security requirements 
  10 







4. Appendix D (Explanation of different categories of security practices at 
requirement phase)  
4.1 More details about practices for document security requirements: 
There are several security requirements documentation practices that mentioned in 
previous studies. Some of these practices are: 
 
- Document the Conceptual security artifacts. 
In requirements engineering, we concentrate on what needs to be done not how to do it. 
So, the term “artifacts” refers to the “what” objects of security requirements engineering 
need to be documented. Security artifacts take the concept of assets and harm threats to 
those assets. There is a collection of security artifact which can be determined or 
documented explicitly. These security artifacts can have a different format such as 
structured (e.g. a catalog) or unstructured [62]. 
- An information security policy  
Security policies and procedures are crucial for any organization. It is considered to be the 
cornerstone of any information security program. It reflects the objectives of organization 
for security and the accepted level about the strategy of management for securing 
information [62]. Security policy or security protocol is a document that contains how does 
the organization protect its assets, including physical or information technology assets. It 
is utilized to determine the rules, laws, practices, and regulations that decide how to 
manage, safeguard and move sensitive information to the organization [65]. This document 
is often updated in each time the technology and employee requirements change. The 
146 
 
Security policy of an organization may contain an acceptable use policy, an explanation on 
how the organization intend to educate its employees on the way of preserving the 
organization assets, a description about the way of carrying out or enforcing security 
measurements, and a process of how to evaluate the effectiveness of the security policy to 
ensure mandatory correction [64]. Another study [40] made a comparison between the 
processes of secure software development such as Touchpoints, SDL, and CLASP. In this 
study, some activities of these processes are mentioned. For example, the Clasp process 
indicates the importance of the organizational policy document. It also points out that 
security policy has to be considered as a baseline for all software projects [40]. In addition, 
some development processes of secure software such as SDL has clarified the importance 
of addressing the logistics aspects and to document logistics aspects available in the 
Organization since this will ensure the organization has the necessary tools for securing the 
system and specify the type of security bugs that may be addressed in the organization [40].  
Some recommendations provided by previous research about the security policies include  
that they should determine the impact of those polices on the stakeholders; continuous 
reviews and updates to those polices should be made whenever there are any changes in 
the structure of organization or that the organization merges with another organization; the 
revised security policies should be distributed to all relevant stakeholders to ensure all 
stakeholders are conscious about those polices.  
- Initiate templates for documentation of security requirement specification 
This is achieved by using the repository of “Software Requirement Specification 
Template”. The security artifact can be used to derive the documentation which follows 
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the standard of software requirements specification IEEE 1998-830. Thus, in this practice, 
it also concentrates on using a standard in the documentation of security requirements [63].  
- Express security requirements as positive statements instead of negative statements: the 
benefit of expressing security requirements as positive statements can help in the 
satisfaction of those security requirements [3].  
- Security catalog: The security requirement document should include a catalog of security 
which involves the security models for the threats and the corresponding security 
requirements. This catalog contains the security threats that could be exploited by the 
malicious users or attackers. Each security threat will be described in this catalog; the ways 
the attackers can use to breach security of the system. This does not mean to cover all the 
possible threats that can affect the system but, it means this catalog will help in cover a 
broad range of threats that could be harmful to the system. Such as that catalog is STRIDE 
threats modeling. 
- Develop documented access control procedures: This will help implement security 
measures that handle the process of software engineering in a defined and managed way. 
Thus, the development process assurance will be improved [75].  
- Document the security-related procedures: There are standards for these procedures 
such as standard development procedures that contain practical checklist to ensure the 
design of the system without undocumented functions [66].  
- Protection Profile (PP) is a document that is considered by ISO/IEC 15408 and 
the Common Criteria (CC) to be a portion of the certification process. It specifically 
demands some external party like government or standard body. It has to protect each 
security objective. In addition, it has to carry out security functionality in order to present 
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every security functional requirement. Furthermore, it has to supply assurance evidence to 
show that the developed product has met the “evaluation assurance level” which is defined 
in the protection profile [67]. “Security Target includes an overview of the product and 
product's security features, an evaluation of potential security threats and the vendor's self-
assessment detailing how the product conforms to the relevant Protection Profile at the 
Evaluation Assurance Level the vendor chooses to test against”. 
- Use standard for documenting security requirements: There is some standard that deals 
with security requirements such as ISO/IEC 15504-5 and ISO/IEC 27002. For example, 
ISO/IEC 27002 talks about the information security policies. Moreover, ISO/IEC 15504-5 
has a Documentation process that can be utilized to preserve the recorded information that 
is achieved by the information security activities [57].  
 
4.2  More details about practices for elicitation of security requirements: 
- Identify the prescriptive of security requirements which are equivalent to security 
policies with high level perspective. At the beginning, these security policies are obtained 
from an organization and set up immediately to a given project. Then, measures for the 
overall security are dictated. The implemented security policies with high-level will work 
as the security requirements for the developed system. 
- Resultant security requirements are the result of assessment for the system. In this 
activity, the developer will consider any attacks to the system. After that, a trade-off will 
be done between the output requirements with other non-functional requirements. In 




- Secure Development Application will enhance the capturing of security requirements by 
incorporating security aspects throughout the development lifecycle of the application. 
SDA can be seen as an improved set of guidelines and practices that could be integrated to 
existing methodology of software development of the organization [74].  
- Assessing security impact on the system integrity:  First, we need to know what does 
system integrity mean? To answer this question, system integrity is the state of the system 
“where its intended functions are being performed without degradation or being impaired 
by other changes or disruptions to its environments.” Thus, in this practice, we need to 
know the impact of security on the system under different circumstances.  
- Establish the path of attack analysis in order to identify what are the internal 
vulnerabilities of the system. The reason behind this is to avoid the amount of time that it 
takes when using technical assistance of the platform manufacturer. The attack path can be 
revealed by reviewing the documentation such as the interfaces description of the system, 
the configuration diagrams of the system, and hardware configuration of the system. By 
doing these reviews, we can identify the path for those attacks [75].  
- Identify what should be implemented on safety system security capabilities. The 
“security team identified the security controls for the system according to the result of 
security assessment. The security team assigned a priority to a security control due to the 
relationship of attack scenarios [75].”  
- Identify security controls that can be used to rule out vulnerabilities in the system’s 
pathways and exclude those vulnerabilities from the system. This activity is used to identify 
accessible pathways to the cabinet of the system whether physically or logically [75].   
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- Perform security assessment: this practice will help in identifying potential security 
vulnerabilities at requirements phase of system lifecycle. The outcome of security 
assessment is to determine the security controls for the system. The risks of intrusions to 
the system have to be assessed and managed during the software development lifecycle. In 
addition, the focus should be done on the system functionalities besides the involved people 
who used the system since the attacker tries to exploit every weakness that might exist in 
the system [75][66].  
- The extended UML is used to present security notions. There are two basic tools which are 
the use cases and the corresponding scenarios to construct threat models and elicit security 
requirements [76].   
- Web Services Security Requirements (WSSecReq) approach has certain practices to be 
done in order to elicit security practices such as the identification of system security 
threats,;  construction of a group of security artifacts which are inter-related; determining 
misuse cases that are collected in security profiles; applying risk analysis methodology 
(ISO-compliant 15408); and  using reusable approach to specify security requirements 
[63].  
- Elicit adequate security requirements during the requirements engineering process with 
the aid of previous security knowledge. A security catalog, based on problem frames, is 
constructed for this purpose. This elicitation of security requirements can be done by 
analyzing the assets that need to be protected, analyzing the threats from which these assets 
should be protected, considering security while eliciting the requirements of software 
systems using problem frames, and identifying security requirements with the aid of 
previous security knowledge through constructing a security catalog for this purpose. The 
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security catalog consists of problem frame models for threats and the corresponding 
security requirements. Threats are modeled using abuse frames while security requirements 
are modeled using security problem frames [3].  
- The Activities of security requirement elicitation can be done by model the security 
requirements which are planned to alleviate the threats leading to vulnerabilities. Thus, to 
model these security requirement, we use security problem frames which can be found in 
the security catalog. If the domain of the security problem frame is not available in the 
catalog, we follow another technique that is proposed by Heley to elicit security 
requirements. Another way to mitigate the discovered threats is by using the trust 
assumptions. The idea behind the trust assumptions is to make the properties of system 
domains trusted at acceptable level that turn out the system to be safe from vulnerabilities. 
The trust assumption is only used when there is a dilemma with the analysts that make 
them incapable to go further with the problem since there is a belief this problem can be 
solved in another context. 
- “introduces a model syntax checker for specifying security protocols and presents the 
communication behavior of the communication principals under the Dolev–Yao threat 
model. The author invites further studies to be carried out that consist of applying the 
calculus of communicating systems methodologies more rigorously and developing more 
formal tools for the analysis of security and cryptographic protocols.” 
- At the beginning of requirement engineering, we first try to analyze the context of the 
organization within which a system will eventually operate. We identify the goals that have 
to be fulfilled by analyzing the domain of the existing actors and the dependencies between 
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different actors. And for security purpose, we require to rationale about delegation of 
authority and trust relationships [77].  
- Come up with functional dependencies and the requirements of security and trust.  
This can be done by employing the Secure Tropos modeling framework that comes up with 
the functional dependencies. In addition, it also derives the security and trust requirements 
[77]. 
- Fully understanding of possible security risks. This can be done by using misuse cases 
that can be used in security requirement elicitation. Furthermore, the identified misuse 
cases require to be prioritized in order to make a balancing between risk and cost due to 
the large number of misuse cases that can be produced. After identifying the misuse cases, 
we go with the identification of security violation scenarios. There are different techniques 
for identifying the security violation scenarios. One of these techniques, is by using an 
attack tree [65]. 
- Use the Tropos concepts that deal with dependency, task, goal, capability and 
resource which are also expanded with security concerns. In order to achieve security 
constraint during software development, we can use secure goals for that help to achieve 
that purpose. In addition, there is also a secure task for satisfying a secure goal in a specific 
way. Furthermore, a secure resource is a resource which is relevant to security constraint 
or secure entity. 
- There is an existing literature to elicit related privacy and security properties such as 
the “European Commission Draft Report on Security Issues in Cloud Computing” [14], 
“CSA report” [13], “NIST guideline” [29], and Other relevant literature”. Thus, we can use 
these literatures to elicit security requirements [79]. 
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- Use business objectives to derive security requirements. This can be done by doing 
some practices such as identifying requirements for user access identity or user access 
authentication which is considered to be a role-based access controls; defining what are the 
level of data privacy that are associated with the project; and identifying the abuse cases 
beside the use cases [80].  
- “Vulnerabilities are discovered by analyzing threats to and attacks on both the requirements 
and the DW repository. One of the best-known techniques through which to model 
threats/attacks are attack trees, which contain threats, and their possible attacks [153].” 
- Determine what are the general security requirements? And what are the specific 
security requirements? Specific security requirements are requirements type that deal with 
some aspects such as Access control requirement, Data communication requirement, 
Maintenance requirement, and Retirement requirement. Access control requirement has the 
structure of a collection of, property, knowledge, or personal features. Using access control 
is preferred than using just a password.   
- There are some tasks to identify security requirements such as by establishing the structure 
of information security governance; by determining the roles of participant; and by 
identifying profiles that include the structure of security governance. In addition to the 
previous tasks, there are also some practices such as creating a committee for security 
governance and defining top-level security policies. These top-level polices of security 
include the organization’s goals and strategy of business.  
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4.3  More details about practices for analysis and negotiation of security 
requirements: 
- Use the model-based paradigm to analyze the system needs and requirements. 
In order to make a discussion with different stakeholders, we can use various conceptual 
or architectural models. These models can be generated to reflect the requirements. Thus, 
using these models will help in the analysis of security requirements with different 
stakeholders. 
- knowledge of security is a basic necessity prior to practicing security requirement:  
The analyst should have background on how to identify and analyze the system assets, 
threats, vulnerabilities and requirements. One of the characteristics of security 
requirements is to be adequate as possible. Of the other characteristics are explicitly, 
precision, and completion and that they are conflict-free with other requirements.  
 
- AuthUML is used to analyze access control requirements at requirement engineering in 
order to make sure the requirements are consistent, complete, and conflict-free for the 
application being developed. AuthUML will analyze the access due to use cases and 
operations. AuthUML helps in detecting easily the inconsistencies and conflicts of access 
control requirements in small systems due to have just few number of entities and engineers 
who wrote those requirements. On the other hand, in extensive systems, inconsistencies 
and conflicts in access control requirements can be detected using AuthUML by specifying 
rules for that purpose. Since, detecting inconsistencies and conflict as early as possible will 
help to prevent them from spreading to next phases of the lifecycle. AuthUML has four 
phases to be followed which are tackling access control requirements, make sure about 
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completeness, consistency, and conflict-free for both accesses to use cases and access for 
operations, and ensuring compliance of authorization requirements with the Principle of 
Separation of Duties (SoD).  
- Authorization requirements which are specified in the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) can be analyzed by using logical-based framework. This will ensure consistency, 
completion of the access requirement, as well as that they are conflict-free  [89].  
- There are different ways to minimize the level of security expertise that is required during 
the development of the system such as by using the threats library or attack taxonomies. 
Threats libraries can have two forms which are structured or unstructured. These libraries 
have been realized to be effective in different industry scenarios. On the other hand, attack 
taxonomies represent a classification scheme that will assist the developer to find out the 
relevant attacks to the system easily. On the other hand, penetration test is used to check if 
the attacker can endanger the system. It helps to identify known and unknown 
vulnerabilities to the system. 
- There is a need to analyze the requirements in order to detect any potential vulnerabilities 
to the system. This process consists of three models that gather information of the system 
from various perspectives which are multilevel object model that expresses static features; 
multilevel dynamic model that expresses dynamic features; and multilevel functional 
model that expresses transformation features of the system [76]. 
- Comprehensive risk analysis will enhance security. This can be done by following certain 
steps. First, by identifying functions of the system, boundaries for the system, and 
criticalities which exist in the system. The benefits of doing that are to minify the risks to 
an organization's data and information systems. Secondly, by identifying vulnerabilities 
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and security threats. This requires the methodical process of checking and documenting the 
security posture of an organization's information systems. Thirdly, by calculating risk 
factors. This can be achieved by the analysis of possible dangers that the firm faced. 
Fourthly, by making sure all risks that have a critical negative impact are investigated. 
Lastly, by documenting the outputs of the risk analysis [64]. 
- Risk identification can be done using different approaches such as Checklist approach. 
The software process can use checklist to identify risk and assessing risk exposure in a 
quick and low-cost way [90].  
- In this study [83], they showed two analysis techniques for security requirements. The first 
technique is Conditional Reachability Analysis which is created to specify the locations 
that can be reached by an actor. The second technique is Log-trace Reachability Analysis 
which has an input as log file format and depending on this it will specify the place of 
actors, what actions they perform, and what data can they access. 
- The system can be analyzed by identifying the status of the system before, under, and after 
the attack. First, Before the attack, this can be achieved by identifying the system parts that 
can be accessed by which users. In addition, by identifying the location that can be reached 
by the user. Furthermore, by identify potential flows in an access-control system and 
determine who has the authority to access specific locations or restore data. All of these 
can be done by doing conditional reachability analysis (CRA). Second, After the attack by 
be ready for any potential attack. This planning can derive in various forms, it can has the 
form of actions logging to be performed by users. In addition, by Identify what might have 
occurred (unrecognized) in between two log entries. In this situation, the log-trace 
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reachability analysis might be helpful. The log-trace reachability analysis affords the 
investigators with this knowledge. 
In this study [91], there are some tasks to be consider during the analysis of security 
requirements. Task A: define Information of security requirements. The security 
requirements specification has storage service’s which are intimately relevant to its 
technical specification. Task B: analysis of available software environment options. In this 
task, existing alternatives of security mechanism were analyzed to assess their security. 
The final choice must take into account these assessments and satisfactorily negotiate the 
security weight. Task 3: security risk analysis. The organization determined to use Risk 
Assurance Framework called ENISA’s [150] to advocacy this analysis. 
- At the beginning, there is a need to identifying service-related assets information and 
identify potential threats affecting those assets. Thus, personal information beside other 
information related to physical and unphysical assets were also identified. After the 
identification of information assets and possible threats, assessment of the risk would take 
place to evaluate the disclosure to risks. The quantification of risk was needed in order to 
come up with risk management guidelines that would reduce the top threats to the system. 
4.4  More details about practices for describing security requirements: 
- In order to describe security requirements, a simple micropattern textual template can be 
used for phase modifiers. This textual template is enhanced by adding two fields which are 
the Role and Artefacts. The Role describes roles of technical team who are sharing in the 
phase of development process. Whereas, the artefacts are work products that are in the state 
of development at certain phase of software development. 
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- Describe abuse cases by examples: By using examples, we can help readers to have a 
good vision of what might happen in different situations. Thus, we use examples to 
describe the abuse cases for the system.  
- Use metadata to describe a prototype model for data security: The main goal here is to 
minimize the queries of user to only the users who have an access for those data. In 
addition, the Strategic Rationale model is made use of to describe the interests and concerns 
of stakeholder, and the way they could be represented by different configurations of 
systems and environments. Furthermore, to describe the process of concrete software 
development or describe a family of relevant software development process this can be 
done by using SPEM process metamodel. The specification of SPEM follows the structure 
of UML profile, and it is equipped with a complete MOF-based metamodel [81].  
- Misuse Case Description Templates is used for representing a misuse case by text-based 
notation. The benefit of doing that is to describe the misuse cases in a detailed manner and 
more complete which provides the analysis with extra information about the security 
threats that is difficult to be represented in a diagram form. 
- The unambiguity of protection profiles would facilitate Security Targets that elicit the letter 
and the intent of the protection profiles. 
- UML notations are used to describe the processes of security. UML notation is helpful for 
software licensees and developers to enhance the understanding of security requirements. 
It also improves the linkage between licensees, regulators, and developers [66]. 
- Describe security requirements using metaclasses especially for common rational agent 
within systems. These metaclasses will help software engineers to describe security 
requirements for prevalent rational agent that exists in the systems. This will identify 
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security requirements that are associated with their engendered features (mobility, co-
operation, and autonomy). And it will also identify the primitive concepts of modelling 
that needed to express them [92]. 
4.5  More details about practices for validating of security requirements: 
- Manual review can be utilized to inspect impacts of security countermeasures and track 
them back to security requirements. This will help in making sure that these security 
requirements are consistent, correct, and complete. Inspections and reviews should have a 
structure format. This require checking requirements in a systematic manner or by using a 
checklist which will be used as a guidance for the process. All development stages can use 
that as part of verification activities in all phase (security) process patterns [62].  
- The compliance of the authorization requirement can be validated by using AuthUML 
which introduce new phase using the Separation of Duty principle. It validates the 
obligation of the Separation of Duty over the requirement engineering. The validation of 
AuthUML consists of four isolated steps. The first step validates the compliance according 
to separate duties at requirement phase only. The second step validates the compliance 
whenever there are any designate users to roles. . As for the third step, it also verifies the 
compliance whenever the user endeavor to suppose a role to carry out a certain action. The 
fourth and final step also verifies the compliance whenever the user tries to carry out an 
operation [89].  
- Define security requirements as portion of the overall system requirements. By doing 
that, we will induce the potential vulnerabilities by the functional requirements and this 
will help in the validation of security requirements. In addition, to make sure that the safety 
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system does not involve not recommended and unverified functions and review the 
traceability of requirements from the security perspective [75].  
- The Template of security artifact is made use of to formulate the validation case test 
document of security requirements that are determined from the outset. In addition, internal 
validation can be carried out by performing an inspection of the specified security 
requirements in order to examine these security requirements that are not ambiguous, 
conflict-free, and the traceability of the inclusion/exclusion relationships were valid. 
Moreover, External validation can also be carried out by performing review meetings with 
the actors that have contributed to the subprocess of verifying that the collected security 
requirements are satisfied their interests [63].  
- One task of contracts is to validate security vulnerabilities. In addition, contract can be 
used for identifying and tracking security vulnerabilities. Contracts can also be used to 
increase requirements-based on the assertion of security through SDLC. For instance, 
CB_SAMF is a kind of contract that can be incorporated into a development life-cycle to 
verify suspicious vulnerabilities that exist in Linux kernel and relevant device drivers [65].  
- In verification step, there are two validations that needed to be done which are internal 
validation and external verification as presented in [81]. They verify that all requirements 
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